Inhalt


Stichwort: Seinsprinzipien

Autor, Quelle: Flanagan, Quest for Self-Knowledge

Titel: Definition: Akt, Form, Potenz

Index: Definition: Potenz, Form, Akt; Beziehungen zueinander

Kurzinhalt: Form is defined as that structural component of being to be known through a complete explanatory account of all things as those things are related to one another. Act is the third structural component, ...

Text: 10/6 Knowing, then, is not outside being; rather, the structure of knowing corresponds to, and is intrinsic to, the structure of being. To understand and affirm the intrinsic intelligibility of being, it is imperative to understand what it means to move from a descriptive to an explanatory context, and to make that move in such a way that does not discredit descriptive knowing, but that does criticize, recenter, and reorient such descriptive contexts. The metaphysics that we are proposing is an explanatory metaphysics, whose basic terms and relations are the knowers own tripartite, structured activities of knowing, as those structured acts of knowing are oriented by, and dynamically directed to, being. (152; Fs)

11/6 Let us move on to define potency, form, and act. Potency is the structural component to be known in and through a complete intellectual patterning of all experience (the experience of all individuals, of all places and times, of all continuous processes, and of all random or nonsystematic divergencies from expected norms). Potency is to be known through a complete explanatory patterning of all experiences. Potency is not form, but it is functionally related to form. (152; Fs)


12/6 Form is defined as that structural component of being to be known through a complete explanatory account of all things as those things are related to one another. Act is the third structural component, the absolute final and unconditional element that completes and perfects the other two components. Act brings to a final realization and perfection the contribution of form and potency.1 Taken together, these three structural components form a unity since what is experienced is what is understood and what is understood is what is judged. (152; Fs)

13/6 Furthermore, all three components are defined by the term 'form.' Experience presents rather than defines, and act affirms and denies rather than determines and specifies. It is form that specifies, determines, and defines what is presented by experience, while act is also defined by the same form. As well, form is specified as a full explanation of things in their relationships to other things. Thus, potency, form, and act share a common definition, and that definition is anticipatory, or heuristic and explanatory. Furthermore, all three are defined in terms of our own structure of knowing as oriented to an ultimate, unrestricted objective. (notabene)

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Stichwort: Seinsprinzipien

Autor, Quelle: Lonergan, Bernard J.F., The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: Substanz, Akzidenz, Relation

Index: Substanz; 2 Arten von Akzidenz

Kurzinhalt: ... relation, accident, and substance are generic notions and are derived through different ways of defining. Some things are defined by what they themselves are; others are defined by what they themselves are not, ...

Text: 269b I respond that two considerations are required to resolve this question: first, the very notions of relation, accident, and substance must be understood exactly; second, the way in which these notions are verified in things must be clearly and distinctly grasped. (Fs)

Regarding the first consideration, note that relation, accident, and substance are generic notions and are derived through different ways of defining. Some things are defined by what they themselves are; others are defined by what they themselves are not, and this is so in two ways, since some are defined in terms of another in which they are, and others are defined in terms of another to which they are. (Fs)

269c For example, a human being is defined by what a human being is: for a human being is defined as a rational animal, where a human being is both animal and rational. But snubness, eclipse, and circle are defined by what they themselves are not. 'Snubness' is defined in terms of 'nose,' 'eclipse' in terms of a heavenly body such as the sun or the moon, and 'circle' in terms of a plane surface. Snubness is not a nose but in a nose, an eclipse is not the sun or the moon but a darkening in the sun or in the moon, and a circle is not a plane surface but in a plane surface. Thus, in these examples the definition is stated in terms of another in which is found what is defined. Finally, all relatives are defined in terms of another; for relatives are those whose existence is to be to another, and so one must take note that relatives are defined not in terms of another in which they are but in terms of another to which they are. (Fs)

269d Now, the essences of things are known through definitions, and so there are as many kinds of essences as there are kinds of definitions. The essences of what are defined by what they themselves are, or through themselves, are essences without qualification. The essences of what are defined through another are essences in a qualified sense, and this in two ways: the essences of what are defined through another in which they are are essences that are in another, and the essences of what are defined in terms of another to which they are are essences that are to another. (Fs)

271a Further, it is proper to each thing to be in accord with its essence. Those whose essences are without qualification are defined through themselves, and so it is proper to them to be through themselves. Those whose essences are qualified in some respect are defined through another, and so it is proper to them to be through another. This is so in two ways: it is proper to those that are defined through another in which they are, to be in another, and it is proper to those that are defined through another to which they are, to be to another. (Fs)
271b From all this, then, it is clear
(1) what substance is,
(2) the various meanings of 'accident,'
(3) in what sense a relation is an accident, and
(4) how generic these definitions are.

First, then, it is clear that a substance is that to which it is proper to be through itself. Second, it is clear that 'accident' is used in two ways: in a broader sense, an accident is whatever has a qualified essence, but in a stricter sense an accident is that to which it is proper to be in another. Third, it is clear that a relation is both an accident in a broader sense, since it is defined through another, and not an accident in the strict sense, since it is not defined through another in which it is, and therefore 'to be in another' is not what is proper to a relation by definition. Fourth, it is clear that these definitions of substance, accident, and relation are not derived proximately from the concrete reality of things, but quite remotely from generic ways of defining, namely, through self, through another, through another in which the defined is, and through another to which the defined is. (Fs) (notabene)

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Stichwort: Seinsprinzipien

Autor, Quelle: Sertillanges A. D. (Gilbert), Der heilige Thomas von Aquin

Titel: ens et unum convertuntur

Index: Sein, Natur, Einheit; ens et unum convertuntur

Kurzinhalt: Die Einheit besteht also für jede dieser Arten des Seins darin, daß sie sie selbst ist: daß sie in sich selbst geschlossen und [wie gesagt] von allem andern abgeschlossen ist. Daher ist die schicksalhafte Formel: Das Sein und das Eine fallen zusammen ...

Text: 43 Denn das Sein teilt sich nicht wie die Quantität. Nicht durch Zerstückelung wird es ein Vielfaches, sondern durch 'formale Gegensätze', das heißt durch die Unterscheidung der 'Wesenheiten', mögen diese wirklich einander entgegengesetzt oder nur einfach voneinander verschieden sein, mögen sie positive Setzungen oder bloß Beziehungen sein1. (45f; Fs) (notabene)

44 Hier erscheint einer der fundamentalen Gesichtspunkte des ganzen Systems. Den eben bezeichneten gegensätzlichen Auffassungen zum Trotz geht von Pythagoras und Plato über Aristoteles die Auffassung des Seins aus, auf der alle großen thomistischen Thesen beruhen. (46; Fs)

45 Das Sein wird aufgefaßt als eine in sich unbegrenzte Natur, die sich in Wesenheiten entfaltet2. Jedes Ding hat seine Wesenheit, die seinen Anteil am Sein bestimmt3. Die Gesamtheit der Wesenheiten, der wirklichen und der möglichen, wäre gewissermaßen die volle Ganzheit des gesamten Seins; sie würde seinen Begriff erschöpfen; allein das ist nur ein 'Grenzfall', den keine Macht, auch die göttliche nicht, erreichen könnte. (46; Fs) (notabene)

46 Ebenso wie es nach jeder Zahl immer noch eine Zahl gibt, und wie keine Größe die Idee der Größe erschöpft, so ist die Entfaltung des Seins in Wesenheiten von Natur aus ohne Grenzen. Das Sein ist unerschöpflich; seine 'Verwirklichungsmöglichkeiten' stellen ein Unendliches dar. (46; Fs)

47 Die Einheit besteht also für jede dieser Arten des Seins darin, daß sie sie selbst ist: daß sie in sich selbst geschlossen und [wie gesagt] von allem andern abgeschlossen ist. Daher ist die schicksalhafte Formel: Das Sein und das Eine fallen zusammen [ens et unum convertuntur], unmittelbar einsichtig. (46; Fs)

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