Stichwort: Objekt

Autor, Quelle: Lonergan, Bernard J.F., The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: Tätigkeit - Objekt

Index: Bedeutung: Objekt einer Tätigkeit

Kurzinhalt: There are several meanings of the notion 'the object of an operation.' It can mean what moves us to the operation, or the term immanently produced by the operation, or the objective of the operation. In the first ...

Text: 13a There are several meanings of the notion 'the object of an operation.' It can mean what moves us to the operation, or the term immanently produced by the operation, or the objective of the operation. In the first operation the proper object, the object that moves, is, in the conditions of this present life, an intelligibility or nature that exists as embodied in corporeal matter;1 and the object as term is the conceived definition or hypothesis. In the second operation the object that moves is sufficient evidence, and the object as the immanently produced term is the true. But with each operation the object as the objective is being, which is intended throughout the entire intellectual process.2 (Fs)

Stichwort: Objekt

Autor, Quelle: Rhonheimer, Sexualiät und Verantwortung

Titel: Ehelicher Akt - Objekt

Index: Objekt einer Handlung, Objekt des ehelichen Aktes; Anscombe - Intention (Pferd); formae a ratione conceptae

Kurzinhalt: Das Objekt einer menschlichen Handlung ... ist jener Gehalt, der diese Handlung als einen bestimmten Typ von Handlung spezifiziert. Sogenannte "moralische Objekte" sind die Gegenstände der Wahl eines vernunftgeleiteten Strebens (=Wille), etwas zu tun.

Text: 64b Aufgrund des richtigen Verständnisses des Untrennbarkeitsprinzips läßt sich das Objekt des ehelichen Sexualaktes identifizieren. Das Objekt einer menschlichen Handlung (womit wir einen Akt bezeichnen, der vernunftgeleitetem Willen entspringt) ist jener Gehalt, der diese Handlung als einen bestimmten Typ von Handlung spezifiziert. Sogenannte "moralische Objekte" sind die Gegenstände der Wahl eines vernunftgeleiteten Strebens (=Wille), etwas zu tun1. Somit sind Objekte menschlicher Handlungen weder einfach naturgegebene Ziele von Trieben oder Neigungen, noch "Dinge" hinsichtlich derer wir etwas tun, auf die wir abzielen oder die in unseren Handlungen vorkommen. Vielmehr sind Handlungsobjekte, wie Thomas v. Aquin sagt, Formprinzipien von Handlungen, wie sie von der Vernunft erfaßt werden2. Oder, mit den Worten eines zeitgenössischen Autors: "Wir müssen stets im Sinn behalten, daß ein Handlungsobjekt nicht das ist, was der Gegenstand, auf den wir abzielen, ist,; die Beschreibung gemäß der wir strebend auf ihn abzielen, ist das, hinsichtlich derer das 'Worauf-wir-abzielen' Objekt genannt wird"3. Diese etwas komplizierte Formulierung meint etwas ganz Einfaches: Wenn z.B. die Person A ein Pferd der Person B stiehlt, so ist das Objekt dieser Handlung nicht "das Pferd, das rechtmäßiger Besitz von B ist" (der Gegenstand, auf den A abzielt, in seinem "was er ist"), sondern dieses Pferd, insofern es unter eine Beschreibung fällt, die uns angibt, was A, wenn er B das Pferd entwendet, eigentlich erstrebt oder wählt, d.h. was A in einem intentionalen Sinne tut: Das Pferd eines anderen entwenden oder sich aneignen. Das Objekt der Handlung "Pferdediebstahl" ist deshalb: "Ein Pferd, das ein anderer rechtmäßig besitzt, entwenden" (oder: "sich aneignen"). Deshalb sind solche Beschreibungen, unter denen Handlungen gewählt werden (ihre "Objekte"), die intentionalen Gehalte dieser Handlungen, die eben nur Gegenstand der Vernunft sein können; sie sind "formae a ratione conceptae". "Objekt" bezieht sich deshalb darauf, was man tut, wenn man hier und jetzt etwas mit einer Absicht tut4. Genau in dieser intentionalen Weise hatten wir ja früher auch die Objektstruktur der Handlung "Empfängnisverhütung" als eine bestimmte Art intentionaler Handlung beschrieben und definiert (vgl. 1,4). (Fs)

Stichwort: Objekt

Autor, Quelle: Lonergan, Bernard J.F., The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: Verstand (1., 2. Tätigkeit) - Zielobjekt, agent object

Index: Bestimmung des Aktes durch das Objekt (Sein, Wahrheit ...)

Kurzinhalt: ... in relation to our intellect one distinguishes the object that is the goal of intellect (being), the object that is the term of the second operation of intellect (the true) ...

Text: 203c Since an act takes its species from its object, if one discovers different specific objects, one must distinguish different acts.2 (Fs)

203d Now, in relation to our intellect one distinguishes the object that is the goal of intellect (being), the object that is the term of the second operation of intellect (the true), the object that moves the intellect toward its second operation (sufficient evidence), the object that is the term of the first operation of intellect (a definition, a hypothesis), and the object that moves the intellect toward its first operation (the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter). (Fs) (notabene)

Stichwort: Objekt

Autor, Quelle: Lonergan, Bernard J.F., The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: Dualität: Objekt - Subjekt

Index: Falsche Annahme dieser Dualität: Plato, Scotus, Rosmini, Satre

Kurzinhalt: The principle presupposed is simply false and has no basis other than imagining a person looking and the object looked at ... Because of this presupposed principle, the Platonists postulated ...

Text: 211b Objection: The duality of subject and object is intrinsic to the very idea of knowledge. Therefore, if the divine subject were not to utter a word, he would not be able to know himself. But God knows himself. Therefore, he utters a word. (Fs)

Response: The principle presupposed is simply false and has no basis other than imagining a person looking and the object looked at. (Fs)

211c Because of this presupposed principle, the Platonists postulated simple, subsistent, eternal Ideas in a first order, and on the second level the gods who contemplated the Ideas. Because of the same principle, Scotus posited his formal distinction a parte rei, as will be clear below. Because of the same principle, Anton Günther and Antonio Rosmini thought they had discovered a demonstration of the divine Word. Because of the same principle, Jean-Paul Sartre distinguishes between en soi and pour soi in such a way that he impugns as contradictory a God who is real, who is conscious of himself, and who is simple. Because of the same principle, consciousness is conceived as perception of oneself, a view that leads to insoluble difficulties regarding the consciousness of Christ. (Fs) (notabene)

Stichwort: Objekt

Autor, Quelle: Lonergan, C2

Titel: Objekt, Erkenntnis Gottes

Index: Konstitution Dei Filius: Objekt (verschiedene Bedeutungen: Kant, Fichte, Lonergan)

Kurzinhalt: So much for a first meaning of the word "object." There is, however, a second quite different meaning. On this view, objects are what are intended in questioning and what become better known as our answers to questions ...

Text: 121c First, then let us consider two meanings of the word "object." On the one hand, there is the etymological meaning of the word, which was systematized by Kant, and remains in various subsequent philosophies that have not broken loose from Kant's basic influence. On the other hand, there is the meaning implicit in all discourse: an object is what is intended in questioning and becomes known by answering questions. (Fs)

121d The Greek word for object, to antikeimenon, means what lies opposite. The Latin, obiectum, whence are derived our word "object," the French, objet, the Italian, oggetto, means what is put or set or lies before or opposite. The German, Gegenstand, means what stands opposite. In all cases, then, "object" connotes something sensible, localized, locally related presumably to a spectator or sensitive subject. (Fs)

122a In full accord with the etymological meaning of "object" is one of the key sentences in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. It occurs at the very beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic, and it asserts that the one way in which our cognitional activities are related to objects immediately is by Anschauung, by intuition. Since for Kant our only intuitions are sensitive, it follows that the categories of the understanding and the ideals of reason of themselves are empty; they refer to objects only mediately, only inasmuch as they are applied to the objects intuited by sense. Accordingly, our cognitional activity is restricted to a world of possible experience and that a world not of metaphysical realities but of sensible phenomena.1 (Fs) (notabene)

122b Substantially the same position recurs in logical atomism, logical positivism, logical empiricism.2 Inasmuch as there is an insistence on the significance of the logical, discourse is admitted. But this admission is restricted by the affirmation of an atomism, positivism, or empiricism, for the only discourse considered meaningful is discourse that can be reduced to, or be verified in, or at least be falsifiable by sensible objects. (Fs) (notabene)

Kommentar (25.09.08): Cf. Ockhams Verständnis von Intuition

122c However, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have witnessed a series of attempts to get beyond Kant and, in one way or another, these attempts have consisted in an insistence on the subject to offset and compensate for Kant's excessive attention to sensible objects. This was already apparent in the absolute idealisms of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. It took a more personal form with Kierkegaard's emphasis on the contingently existing subject and with the emphasis on will in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The phenomenological studies of intersubjectivity by Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler and the various forms of existentialism have set up against die objectivist world of impersonal science a not-to-be-objectified inner world of subjects striving for authenticity. (Fs)

123a Now it is clear that God is not and cannot be an object in the etymological sense, in the Kantian sense, in the sense acceptable to a logical atomism, positivism, or empiricism. Moreover, as long as such a notion of object prevails, phenomenology and existentialism may allow us some access to God as a subject to whom we are subjectively orientated. (Our hearts are restless till they rest in thee), but any procedure that regards God as an object will remain excluded. (Fs) (notabene)

123b So much for a first meaning of the word "object." There is, however, a second quite different meaning. On this view, objects are what are intended in questioning and what become better known as our answers to questions become fuller and more accurate. (Fs) (notabene)

123c Objects are what are intended in questioning. What is this intending? It is neither ignorance nor knowledge but die dynamic intermediary between ignorance and knowledge. It is the conscious movement away from ignorance and towards knowledge. When we question, we do not know the answer yet, but already we want the answer. Not only do we want the answer but also we are aiming at what is to be known through the answer. Such, then, is intending and, essentially, it is dynamic. It promotes us from mere experiencing to understanding by asking what and why and how. It promotes us from understanding to truth by asking whether this or that is really so. It promotes us from truth to value by asking whether this or that is truly good or only apparendy good. As answers accumulate, as they correct, complete, qualify one another, knowledge advances. But answers only give rise to still further questions. Objects are never completely, exhaustively known, for our intending always goes beyond present achievement. The greatest achievement, so far from drying up the source of questioning, of intending, only provides a broader base whence ever more questions arise. (Fs) (notabene)

Stichwort: Objekt

Autor, Quelle: Lonergan, Bernard J.F., The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: Notion, Definition: Objekt - Akt des Verstehens

Index: Der Akt des Verstehens 2 - Notion des Objekts; Objekt: aktive - passive Potenz

Kurzinhalt: Therefore an object can be either a mover that brings about an act in a potency, or a term produced by an act, or the end to which a potency tends through acts.

Text: 1 The Notion of Object

561b Object is defined by St Thomas in terms of a causal relation to potency and to act. Therefore an object can be either a mover that brings about an act in a potency, or a term produced by an act, or the end to which a potency tends through acts. (Fs)

Summa theologiae, 1, q. 77, a. 3 c: 'Every action belongs either to an active potency or to a passive potency. But an object is to the act of a passive potency as principle and moving cause; for color is the principle of vision insofar as it moves the faculty of sight. But an object is to the act of an active potency as term and end; as the object of the faculty of growth is achieving its due quantity, which is the end of growth.' (notabene)

See also De veritate, q. 16, a. 1, ad 13m; In II De anima, lect. 6, §305; Quaestiones disputatae De anima, a. 13 c; Summa tkeologiae, 1-2, q. 18, a. 2, ad 3m; Theological Studies 8:3 (1947) 433-37 [Verbum 138-43]. (Fs)

561c It follows, then, that the notion of object is not a primitive notion but is reducible to the notions of potency, act, mover, and end or term. Therefore, do not talk about attaining an object without having thought about which clearly defined relation you are referring to. (Fs)

Stichwort: Objekt

Autor, Quelle: Lonergan, Bernard J.F., The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: Objekt des Intellekts: Term und Ziel

Index: Objekt des Intellekts: Term und Ziel (Wort und Sein); Verhältnis: "Ding" - inneres - äußeres Wort

Kurzinhalt: The object of the intellect as its end is being, in the widest sense of the word.

Text: 2 The Object of the Intellect as End and Term

563a The object of the intellect as its end is being, in the widest sense of the word. For the intellect is that which can make and become all things, and 'all' is not restricted to any genus. Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 7 c. (Fs; tblVrw)

But the object of the intellect as the term produced within the intellect itself is the 'word of the heart' or 'inner word.' And since there are two intellectual operations, there are also two terms produced immanently, namely, the simple word or definition and the compound word or proposition,1 that is, the true or the false. De veritate, q. 4, a. 2; q. 3, a. 2; De potentia, q. 8, a. 1; q. 9, a. 5; Quaestiones quodlibetales, 5, a. 9; Super loannem, c. 1, lect. 1. (Fs)

563b The existence of these inner words is proven from the meaning of outer words. We speak of 'man' or 'triangle,' and we surely mean something by these words. Unless, therefore, you believe that universals subsist as real entities, you will necessarily conclude that universals are conceived in the mind and signified directly and immediately by external words. Again, human speech states what is true and what is false. What, then, is signified directly and immediately by a false statement? Unless along with the neo-positivists you maintain that false statements signify nothing, you will necessarily acknowledge a compound word formed inwardly in the mind and signified directly and immediately in an external statement. Finally, we all hold that human speech also signifies things, and yet we do not accept anything unless it is true. But the true and the false are in the mind; truth, in fact, is formally only in a judgment. Again, therefore, one must conclude that outer words signify things, not immediately, of course, but through the medium of inner words that are true. (Fs)

563c Hence, primarily and per se outer words, whether spoken or written or present in the imagination, signify and are not signified. Things, on the other hand, are signified, but primarily and per se do not signify. Inner words, however, both signify and are signified: they are signified by outer words, and signify things themselves. (Fs) (notabene)

563d For this reason one must be careful not to confuse inner words either with the act of understanding or with thinking, defining, supposing, considering, affirming, or denying. An inner word is that which is understood, is thought, is defined, is supposed, is considered, is affirmed, is denied-not, of course, according to its natural existence but according to its intentional existence. Intentional existence is the medium in which a thing is known. (Fs) (notabene)
565a Furthermore, an inner word is not noesis but a noema, not la pensée pensante but la pensée pensée, not an intending intention but an intended intention, not the intention of the one understanding, but the intention understood.2