Stichwort: Wert

Autor, Quelle: Lonergan, A Second Collection

Titel: Wert, transzendentale Notion

Index: Wert: transzendentaler "Begriff" (wie Sein); Intention des Wertes, aber kein Wissen davon

Kurzinhalt: What, then, is value? I should say that it is a transcendental notion like the notion of being. Just as the notion of being intends but, of itself, does not know being, so ...

Text: 82a What, then, is value? I should say that it is a transcendental notion like the notion of being. Just as the notion of being intends but, of itself, does not know being, so too the notion of value intends but, of itself, does not know value. Again, as the notion of being is dynamic principle that keeps us moving toward ever fuller knowledge of being, so the notion of value is the fuller flowering of the same dynamic principle that now keeps us moving toward ever fuller realization of the good, of what is worth while. (Fs)

Stichwort: Wert

Autor, Quelle: Lonergan, A Second Collection

Titel: Werturteil, Gewissen

Index: Wert: transzendentale Notion; Gewissen - Werturteil; Aristoteles, der tugendhafte Mensch

Kurzinhalt: You're not sure of your moral judgments unless you're sure you're a virtuous man!

Text: 221b "Beyond that there's the transcendental notion of values, in the question for deliberation-'Is this worthwhile? or are we wasting our time?' It stops you-and in the judgment of value in answer to that question. This demands not only these feelings-if you just have these feelings, well, you have a moral idealism that usually does more harm than good-you have to have also an apprehension of human reality, and possibility, and what probably will happen from different courses of action. (Fs)

221c "For your judgment of values, for the objectivity of a judgment of value, the criterion is the good conscience of the virtuous man. You're not sure of your moral judgments unless you're sure you're a virtuous man! It's very Aristotelian, incidentally. Aristotle made ethics empirical by postulating the existence of virtuous men. (Fs) (notabene)

Stichwort: Wert

Autor, Quelle: Lawrence, G. Frederick, The Ethics of Authenticity and the Human Good: Beyond Left and Richt in Politics

Titel: Lonergan - Werterfassung (apprehensions of value)

Index: Lonergan: zweifache Auffassung von apprehension of value; Wert - Gefühle

Kurzinhalt: Lonergan sometimes names such acts of understanding or insight in response to questions for deliberation 'apprehensions of value';1 and sometimes he suggests that the feelings themselves as intentional responses to values are already 'apprehensions of ...

Text: 15a Lonergan's account of value reached its most mature stage when he developed his theory of feelings and made explicit the transcendental notion of value by which he was able to expand his account of knowing to synthesize feelings. He distinguished feelings like tiredness and hunger as correlative to non-intentional states and trends from feelings that are intentional responses to objects, whether of pleasure and pain or of our highest aspirations. Among such intentional feelings he distinguished between those that do discriminate between what is truly good and what is apparently good, and those feelings that do not. In discriminating true from merely apparent goods, feelings as intentional responses "put themselves in a hierarchy" of the vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values spoken of above.1 On what basis are these feelings as intentional responses capable of discriminating and discerning among values? What allows feelings to reveal values? In agreement with Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand, Lonergan ascribes the ability of feelings to "see" values to whether or not, and how, we are in love.2 (Fs) (notabene)

15b Situations demanding action or appreciative response are feeling-laden. In them there spontaneously arises within us the transcendental notion of value marked by the questions, Is this worthwhile? or What am I to do?3 These are questions for deliberation. They call for insights into the intentional feelings usually already being felt and evoked by the situation. Lonergan sometimes names such acts of understanding or insight in response to questions for deliberation 'apprehensions of value';4 and sometimes he suggests that the feelings themselves as intentional responses to values are already 'apprehensions of value.'5 At any rate, when deliberation occurs, intelligence and feeling come together in formulating possible courses of action, or in discerning just what the feelings and values at stake might happen to be. Deliberation needs an understanding and formulation of a possible course of action in order to ask the further question, Should I do it?, to arrive at a judgment of value, and to come to a decision. (Fs) (notabene)