Stichwort: Gnade

Autor, Quelle: Ormerod, Neil, Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Titel: Gnade - sanans, operativa, co-operativa

Index: Gnade, das Übernatürliche 1; Unmöglichkeit der Selbst-Erlösung (co-dependent person; Sucht); heilende, operative, ko-operative Gnade. - Freiheit d. Wahl (Widerspruch, weil: F. von Sünde); Konversion, moralische Impotenz; Entscheidung, Wertskala

Kurzinhalt: If sin distorts and cripples our freedom, then in the first instance the impact of grace is to heal and strengthen our freedom so that we may break out of the compulsive power of sin.

Text: GRACE AS HEALING

109b If sin distorts and cripples our freedom, then in the first instance the impact of grace is to heal and strengthen our freedom so that we may break out of the compulsive power of sin. Concretely the decisions we make embody the values we hold-not the values we "notionally" hold but the values we actually hold. Our decisions manifest our own personal scale of values, and a freedom that is captured by sin arises out of a heart whose response to value is fundamentally distorted. As we explored in our discussion of original sin, a key element of this distortion is our sense of our own personal value, our spontaneous sense of our own value or self-esteem. It may be that I feel myself to be unlovable, or that I love myself for all the wrong reasons, puffing myself up with a sense of self-righteousness. Decisions emerge either out of my efforts to bolster my sense of my own goodness or to confirm my own sense of worthlessness. (Fs) (notabene)

110a Despite the promises of self-help gurus, there is a sense in which I simply cannot solve this problem on my own. If my own sense of self is the problem, then all my efforts at "self-help" emerge out of the very same self that needs the help. My efforts will suffer from the same distortions and lead to a reproduction of the same problems in the new edition of "me." I can even enlist others into the project through manipulating them into helping me, but this again emerges from the same distorted self and leads to further reproduction of the same problem once again. In addiction literature this is such a common issue that it gains its own label, co-dependency. The co-dependent person seeks to assist the addict, but does so within the horizon of the addict and his or her addiction. Such co-dependency actually makes things worse, under the guise of seeking to help. (Fs) (notabene)

110b If a solution is to be found, it must be entirely "gratuitous," something that comes to us from a source beyond our manipulation, beyond our control. It must come to us from a source that is untouched by the distortions we suffer, a source of goodness greater than our own. Finally, it must be able to love us "as we are," love the real goodness that we have and so heal the distortions present in our self-esteem by grounding us in the reality of our own real goodness, a goodness that is ours as creations of a wise and loving God. This love must be strong enough to be able to break through the distortions we generate and the lies we tell ourselves. It must be able to confront those distortions and lies, yet do so in a way that both demands and empowers a real change of heart within us. This is the meaning of "grace as healing." (notabene)

110c A traditional theology speaks of this inbreaking of grace as "operative grace."1 God operates on the sinner, taking out the heart of stone and replacing it with a heart of flesh. Such an operation is not dependent on the freedom of the sinner-in fact, God operates to restore the freedom of the sinner, freeing it from its slavery to sin. It is not an attack on our freedom; rather it liberates our freedom to be true to its orientation to the good. However, if we conceived of freedom simply as "freedom of choice" then the notion of operative grace will always appear as somehow contrary to the freedom of the sinner, because it "reduces" our "freedom" to sin. On the other hand, if we view freedom as directed toward good, sin represents a distortion of our freedom. In this case operative grace reestablishes us in true freedom by allowing us once again to act toward the truly good. (Fs)

111a In more modern terms, the prime example of such operative grace is what we would call "conversion." Conversion is not something I produce in myself. It comes to me from without, something that acts upon me. Conversion has various modalities, but a key feature of conversion is the radical change of life it produces in the newly converted subject.2 After conversion everything is different; the world has changed. Fear turns to courage, hatred to love, resentment to forgiveness, despair to hope, and hardness of heart to compassion. Things that were once impossible-for example, the ability to resist temptation-now become easy; things that were part of the routine of my life-for example, engaging my addiction-become repulsive. I am a new person "walking in the light" compared with the old me that "walked in the darkness" (see John 8:12). In this phase Catholic theology will speak of grace as "cooperative," inasmuch as the grace of conversion allows us to cooperate freely in achieving the good. (Fs)

111b Perhaps some of the best accounts of this conversion experience come out of literature dealing with the problems of addiction, such as Twelve Step programs. Indeed the first three steps of Alcoholics Anonymous are:

1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol-that our lives had become unmanageable. (Fs)
2. We came to believe that a power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity.
3. We made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we understood Him.3

111c These three steps provide a solid summary of a Christian theology of grace: the problem of moral impotence ("we are powerless over alcohol"), the need for operative grace ("a power greater than ourselves"), and the new-found freedom that this grace as cooperative brings to the converted subject ("made a decision to turn our will..."). (Fs)

Stichwort: Gnade

Autor, Quelle: Ormerod, Neil, Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Titel: Dialektik: Gnade - Sünde

Index: Dialektik: Gnade - Sünde; Konversion, Augustinus (Confessiones, Retractationum); M. Luther, K. Barth vs. Gnade - Natur

Kurzinhalt: Augustine's theology of grace focuses on the existential situation of the individual, caught between being either a "slave to sin" or a "slave to God's law" (see Rom 7:25). Faced with such a dialectic of sin and grace Augustine could find no middle ...

Text: THE GRACE/SIN DIALECTIC

111d One of the most moving accounts of conversion found in Christian literature is that of Augustine in book 8 of his Confessions. In it he recounts his own struggle with continence or sexual purity. This was the last moral obstacle for him in coming to the Christian faith,1 and he felt powerless to do anything about his own weakness in this regard. In the end the radical change in his life did not come about through his own efforts at "self-control" but through the power of God's grace, initiated through the reading of a text from Romans. God produces a change in Augustine, and once that change occurred his problems with continence disappeared. It is clear that this pivotal experience shaped Augustine's whole theology of grace, and through him, the theology and doctrine of the Western church. (Fs) (notabene)

112a Augustine's theology of grace focuses on the existential situation of the individual, caught between being either a "slave to sin" or a "slave to God's law" (see Rom 7:25). Faced with such a dialectic of sin and grace Augustine could find no middle ground, no neutral place that was neither sin nor grace. Consequently Augustine could find nothing good in the life of a pagan-the virtues of the pagans are vices in disguise! Indeed, so extreme was this dialectical position that at one point Augustine even denied that pagans could know anything. Though he was later to retract this position (Retractationum 1.4), it was the logical outcome of the dialectic position he adopted. (Fs)

112b This difficulty points to an unresolved tension in the work of Augustine. On the one hand, his dialectic of grace and sin clearly identifies and highlights the healing qualities of grace. This is a lasting contribution of Augustine's theology of grace. On the other hand, this same dialectical approach paints a black and white account of the human condition. Either one is "all sin'or "all grace." The danger with such an account of the human condition is that it comes close to a form of dualism whereby the finitude of our human state becomes identified with sin itself. We have already seen this type of problem in relation to Augustine's blurring of the distinction between original sin and concupiscence. (Fs) (notabene)

112c Faced with such tensions, theological reflection can move in two distinct directions. One may seek to reinforce the dialectic, making it the fundamental starting point of one's theology. This is the direction taken by Martin Luther and the other reformers. One of the most powerful modern exponents of such a dialectical theology is the great Swiss theologian Karl Barth. For Barth all human reason is suspect, and all human motivation corrupt: "Faith ... grips reason by the throat and strangles the beast."2 Human nature of itself has nothing positive to contribute. (Fs)

113a The alternative is to seek to give some account of the "middle ground" between sin and grace, an arena of goodness that is "natural," not sin, but not yet the salvific goodness of divine grace. It is this line of development that led to the classical grace/nature distinction that became the foundation for the Catholic theology of Thomas Aquinas.3

Stichwort: Gnade

Autor, Quelle: Ormerod, Neil, Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Titel: Gnade - Natur (Thomas)

Index: Dialektik: Gnade - Natur; Thomas (Augustinus); divinum auxilium - natürliches Licht der Vernunft; reine Natur - gefallene N. (Wille); Verdienste - ewiges Leben; orthodoxe Tradition: theosis, Hesychasmus; gratia sanans, elevans; Pelagius

Kurzinhalt: Human nature is good in itself prior to original sin and can attain the good proportionate to it, but not the supernatural good of salvation, which requires God's grace. After the fall, human nature is weakened and can attain the good proportionate ...

Text: THE GRACE/NATURE DISTINCTION

113b While Aquinas was not the first of the medieval theologians to introduce the grace/nature distinction, his is the most systematic exploitation of its potential to deal with the tensions present in the Augustinian legacy.1 In ST I-II q. 109, a. 1. Aquinas begins his account of grace by focusing on a very precise point of tension in the work of Augustine: Whether one can know any truth without grace. After noting objections to the position drawn from the writings of Augustine, and then noting Augustine's own retraction of those objections, Aquinas seeks his own response. He acknowledges that to know anything at all requires God's help (divinum auxilium), but such help should not be equated with a grace that brings salvation: (Fs) (notabene)

We must therefore say that, if a man is to know any truth whatsoever, he needs divine help in order that his intellect may be moved to its act by God. But he does not need a new light added to his natural light in order to know the truth in all things, but only in such things as transcend his natural knowledge.

113c Thus, there is a "natural light" of intellect proportionate to natural human knowledge, but there is also the possibility of a revealed knowledge that requires something added to this natural light, that is the light of faith. In this we see the beginnings of the grace/nature distinction. (Fs) (notabene)

113d Aquinas immediately then moves from the intellect to the will: Whether one can will or do any good without grace (ST I-II q. 109, a. 2). This lies at the heart of the grace/sin dialectic, at least in its extreme form. In this dialectic there is either sin or grace, and without grace nothing good can be achieved. Aquinas initially responds by distinguishing between nature in its pure state and nature in its fallen state. As in the previous response, "divine help" is needed for any motion of the will, as of the intellect, but the good proportional to nature is possible without grace to human nature prior to the fall. What of "fallen" nature? Here Aquinas departs from Augustine:

In the state of corrupt nature he falls short of what nature makes possible, so that he cannot by his own power fulfill the whole good that pertains to his nature. Human nature is not so entirely corrupted by sin, however, as to be deprived of natural good altogether. Consequently, even in the state of corrupt nature a man can do some particular good by the power of his own nature, such as build houses... But he cannot achieve the whole good natural to him, as if he lacked nothing. (Fs)

114a Aquinas is here asserting that even in the fallen state we are capable of some good, always with divine help, but not necessarily grace. He moves on to make a classical assertion about the necessity of grace:

Thus in the state of pure nature man needs a power added to his natural power by grace, for one reason, namely, in order to do and to will supernatural good. But in the state of corrupt nature he needs this for two reasons, in order to be healed, and in order to achieve the meritorious good of supernatural virtue. (Fs)

Kommentar (11.09.12): Die "Hilfe" Gottes als "Erstbeweger" bei jedem Akt des Verstehens und Wollens ist unterschieden von Gnade. Relation: "Hilf : Gnade = Schöpfung – Übernatürliches Leben.

114b By this stage Aquinas has effectively dismantled the grace/sin dialectic through the theoretical construct of human nature. Human nature is good in itself prior to original sin and can attain the good proportionate to it, but not the supernatural good of salvation, which requires God's grace. After the fall, human nature is weakened and can attain the good proportionate to it only in a spasmodic fashion. In this fallen state grace is necessary for two reasons: first, to heal our weakened orientation to the good, and, second, to elevate our nature to a higher end, to be able to attain God in the beatific vision. (Fs) (notabene)

114c The climax of this line of questioning then comes in ST I-II q. 109, a. 5: Whether one can merit eternal life without grace. Here the grace/nature distinction comes to the fore:

Now eternal life is an end that exceeds what is commensurate with human nature ... it follows that a man cannot, by his natural powers produce meritorious works commensurate with eternal life. A higher power is needed for this, namely, the power of grace. Hence a man cannot merit eternal life without grace, although he can perform works which lead to such good as is connatural to him. (Fs)

114d In this passage we can see Aquinas's ultimate rejection of Pelagian anthropology. Human nature is here conceived of ideologically, as oriented to certain ends, with its own operations and power to achieve proportionate ends, rather than an empirical conception of human nature, as found in Augustine. Human nature, according to Aquinas, is oriented to an end, the vision of God, which it simply cannot attain through the operations of its own nature. This end is supernatural, completely beyond the capabilities of any finite nature. (Fs)

115a Our attaining of this end can come about only through a special gift from God, something that makes us able to attain what we cannot attain through our own powers. This grace/nature distinction, while recognizing that grace is healing, focuses our attention on the elevating activity of grace. Grace is "supernatural."

Excursus on Grace and Divinization

While the Catholic tradition has adopted a metaphysical approach that speaks of grace in terms of its relation to the natural order-hence grace as supernatural-the Eastern Orthodox tradition has focused more on the implications of 2 Peter 1:4, that we become sharers of the divine nature through grace. For example, Gregory Nazianzus adopts the language of deification or theosis. This is a new creation that is "more godlike and exalted" than the first creation. This deification is realized by Christ in the incarnation and perfected in the economy of salvation by the Holy Spirit, "appropriated individually in baptism as well as in ascetic and philanthropic acts and finally consummated in the future life."2 Theosis is a reflection of God's light and brightness; it is proximity to, illumination by, and knowledge of God, demanding imitation of Christ and love of neighbor on our part. It is both God's gift and the reward for human effort. (Fs)

The issue of theosis finds a more theoretical explanation in the doctrine of the "uncreated energies of God." Cyril of Alexandria spoke of the Holy Spirit implanting a "divine form" in us through sanctification.3 While this does give expression to the notion of divinization, it is fraught with difficulties. What is the divine form that Cyril is talking about? In Aristotelian terms the form is what makes a thing what it is. The divine form is divinity itself, that is, God. How can this be implanted within us without both compromising the divine transcendence and making us something other than human?

A theoretical response to this was proposed by Gregory Palamas (1296-1359), a monk from Mount Athos. Some would place his contribution to the East as high as that of Aquinas in the West. The context of Palamas's contribution was a dispute concerning the monks' practice of Hesychastic prayer.4 During this prayer the monks claimed to behold the glory of God, the uncreated light of the divine essence that had appeared to the disciples during the transfiguration. Some rejected this claim, arguing that any light they saw must be a created light. Pala-mas responded by developing the doctrine of the uncreated divine energies, and so developed a distinction between the divine essence, which is unknowable (God-in-Godself), and the uncreated energies (God-for-us) that are God in relationship to the created order.5 This position is common among Eastern Orthodox theologians today. (Fs)

116a For Aquinas, this metaphysical analysis is not without psychological content. In discussing whether it is possible in the state of nature to love God above all things (ST I-II q. 109, a. 3) he says it is, but grace adds "an immediate willingness and joy to the natural love of God." Grace is "God's love poured into our hearts" (Rom 5:5), but not God loving us, but us loving God.6 While God loving us manifests the healing power of grace, it is in us loving God as God is in Godself that the elevating power of grace is realized. It is our love response to God that transcends the limits of our natural human power of love and reveals the supernatural nature of grace. (Fs)

116b The introduction of the grace/nature distinction allowed Aquinas to resolve the unresolved tensions present in the Augustinian theology of grace, which took as its starting point the grace/sin dialectic. Since then the grace/nature distinction has found a relatively permanent place in a Catholic understanding of grace and salvation.7 However, it is not without some difficulties. In particular it seems to posit two distinct ends for human existence, a natural end that is attainable through natural powers of human nature, and a supernatural end, which is attainable only through divine grace. How is this possible without dividing human beings in two, without introducing a deep division in the soul? Historically this problem found its focus in the question: Is there a natural desire to see God?

Stichwort: Gnade

Autor, Quelle: Ormerod, Neil, Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Titel: Gnade - Cajetan

Index: Schau Gottes, Gnade; Dilemma: menschl. Natur mit 2 Zielen; (natürlich - übernatürlich); Augustinus - Thomas (natürliches Verlangen nach der Ursache); Cajetan (Stockwerke-Theologie; gratia elevans vs sanans)

Kurzinhalt: Is our desire for God part of our human nature, or is it a supernatural gift from God? The posing of this question causes a dilemma... While grace was "elevating," ... it was no longer clear how or even why it could be healing ...

Text: THE NATURAL DESIRE TO SEE GOD

116c Perhaps no phrase from Augustine is more well known than his expression of the restlessness of the human heart: "You have made us for yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in you" (Confessions 1.1). It is interesting, then, to learn that in the later part of his life, Augustine became more tentative about making such a statement, particularly in relation to our fallen nature. It seemed to imply a natural ability to move toward God, but Augustine's later, more dialectical approach found that unacceptable.1 However, once a place is found in theology for introducing the grace/nature distinction, the question then arises, Is our desire for God part of our human nature, or is it a supernatural gift from God? The posing of this question causes a dilemma. If our desire for God is part of our human nature, then, given that the fulfillment of that desire can only be the beatific vision, which is strictly supernatural, it would seem that God created human nature incapable of attaining its end. Apart from grace, human nature would be eternally frustrated. On the other hand, if the desire is supernatural, then theology needs to account for two distinct ends of human existence, one natural, the other supernatural, running the danger of splitting human beings in two.2 How are these two ends related to each other? Unless a solution can be found to this dilemma, the intellectual coherence of the construct of human nature remains subject to suspicion, and we should return perhaps to the grace/sin dialectic. (Fs) (notabene)

117a Historically, this problem focused on the teaching of Thomas Aquinas that human nature has a natural desire to see God:

If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than that he is; the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. (ST I-II, q. 3, a. 8)

117a The great Thomist commentator Cajetan (1469-1534) found difficulty with this position of a "natural" desire.3 If there is a natural desire, then this orientation is an orientation to grace in a human nature that is taken to be self-sufficient and self-enclosed. It threatened the gratuity of grace by creating in human nature an exigence or demand for grace in order for it to achieve its final happiness. If we have such a desire, then God must offer us grace in justice to the desire God has planted within us. His conclusion was that grace was somehow extrinsic to "pure" human nature, conceived of as a self-enclosed and complete existence. This developed in the "two-storey" theology of grace, which understood the supernatural as an extrinsic superstructure to human nature. This notion of a "pure" human nature was elevated to a necessary theological principle in order to preserve the gratuity of grace. Human nature was conceived of as having two ends, a natural end determined by its nature, within its powers to attain, and a supernatural end, unrelated to its natural end, totally beyond its powers to attain. While grace was "elevating," adding supernatural ends to human existence, it was no longer clear how or even why it could be healing, and so was lost the great Augustinian insight into grace. (Fs)

118a With few exceptions, this extrinsicist position of Cajetan became the dominant one in Catholic theology until the twentieth century. In its wake came a fatal separation of grace from nature, the sacred from the profane, the religious from the secular, and the spiritual from the mundane. Eventually it came under increasing pressure in the twentieth century with the recovery of the work of the early church fathers, to whom the scholastic construct of human nature was unknown. This led to a period of bitter dispute and debate around a movement known as the nouvelle theologie.4 We shall briefly consider three responses that emerged during this debate, those of Henri de Lubac, Karl Rahner, and Bernard Lonergan. (Fs)

Stichwort: Gnade

Autor, Quelle: Ormerod, Neil, Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Titel: Gnade - De Lubac

Index: Gnade - De Lubac (zwei Hauptthesen): natürliches Verlangen nach Gott: konstitutiv für menschl. Natur -- Ablehnung des Begriffs einer "rein" menschl. Natur (historisches, spekulatives Argument); Pius XII, Humani Generis

Kurzinhalt: The first major thesis of de Lubac's theology is that we are all constituted by a natural desire for God, that this desire is constitutive of our human nature, and that we are freely constituted in this way precisely because ...

Text: 118b De Lubac's position was spelled out in two works, a historical study of the concept and doctrines concerning the supernatural, entitled Supernaturel, and a later, more thorough work that sought to respond to some of the criticisms of his earlier work, while restating its main theses, entitled The Mystery of the Supernatural.1

118c The first major thesis of de Lubac's theology is that we are all constituted by a natural desire for God, that this desire is constitutive of our human nature, and that we are freely constituted in this way precisely because God has destined us for the beatific vision. God has willed us to be the way we are, to have a certain "nature" precisely because in the providential ordering of creation we are destined to attain God as God is in Godself. God creates us with a certain finality, and that finality is intrinsic to our nature, to what we are. This position preserves the gratuity of grace because God has freely chosen to create us as beings destined for Godself. However, our desire in itself is ineffective, incapable of attaining that which it desires. De Lubac is here rejecting a position that would think of abstract natures as existing apart from the totality of creation itself, with detachable or interchangeable finalities. (Fs) (notabene)

119a The minor thesis that de Lubac draws from this intrinsic account of grace and its gratuity is that, although God freely chooses to create us with a given finality, once that free decision has been made, "God does not renege on completing a tendency freely willed by Godself. The desire is also, therefore, absolutely, unconditioned and unfrustratable on God's part."2 Therefore, God will not deny the beatific vision to beings so constituted. This was a sticking point for many of de Lubac's contemporaries. Why is this suggestion a problem? The natural desire to see God is so clearly linked with the desire to know (see the text above from Aquinas), and that desire to know is constitutive of us as rational and hence spiritual creatures. Consequently, de Lubac seemed to be concluding that God could not create rational creatures without destining them for the beatific vision. It appears to thus undermine the gratuity of grace. This was a position that was later to be explicitly rejected by Pius XII in his encyclical Humani Generis.3 (Fs) (notabene)

119b The second major thesis of de Lubac's theology is his attack on the concept of pure nature, an attack that is twofold. First, on the historical level he argues that the concept was unknown to the early church fathers, that it is a misinterpretation of Aquinas, and that the uniform position of the early fathers is that human beings have a single end, that is supernatural. Second, at the speculative level de Lubac argues that the hypothesis of pure nature, while invented to preserve the gratuitousness of grace, does nothing of the sort. In the concrete historical order, we are in fact oriented to grace, so a merely hypothetical construct that protects the gratuity of grace in a hypothetical order tells us nothing about the gratuity of grace in this historical order. A hypothetical humanity in an order of pure nature would simply not be the same humanity we currently experience. (Fs) (notabene)

119c The strength of de Lubac's position is his attempt to overcome the static conceptualist worldview that has dominated the standard position since Cajetan. This position viewed natures as preexisting in the mind of God (like Platonic ideas), who then created a world in which to implant these natures. De Lubac reminds us that God created natures always and already embedded in a particular world order. He also restored the Thomistic position regarding the "natural" desire to see God, which had got lost in the standard position of Cajetan. This helped overcome the extrinsicism of the standard position, which denied any element of human experience in regard to the supernatural.4 The weakness was that he pushed his argument too far. While one may agree that it is fitting for God to ordain a supernatural end for all rational creatures, such fittingness is not a demonstration of necessity. (Fs)

Stichwort: Gnade

Autor, Quelle: Ormerod, Neil, Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Titel: Gnade - Rahner (übernatürliches Existential)

Index: Schau Gottes, Gnade; K. Rahner vs. De Lubac; übernatürliches Existential; anonymer Christ; Heil außerhalb der Kirche - Frage d. historischen Vermittlung (, J. B. Metz)

Kurzinhalt: On Rahner's notion of the supernatural existential, grace is always and everywhere on offer, in transcendental mode, that is, as offer within human consciousness. This has important consequences, especially in interreligious dialogue.

Text: 120a Among those who rejected de Lubac's position was Karl Rahner. Rahner has been without doubt the most influential theologian in the theology of grace.1 His positions have become a theological commonplace with friend and foe alike. Like de Lubac, Rahner wanted to overcome the extrinsicism of the standard position. However, he was far more determined to maintain the grace/nature distinction, and hence more careful than de Lubac in that regard. The reach of Rahner's theology of grace is extensive and encompasses more than the grace/nature debate, though that debate and the position Rahner develops in light of it are the key to his theology. (Fs)

120b Rahner's solution to the problem of extrinsicism is to introduce the notion of what he calls a "supernatural existential." This is a supernatural orientation or desire for God which nonetheless is empirically constitutive of human nature. What this means is that Rahner holds that every human being has a supernatural desire for God. This desire, however, is not essential to human nature as a nature-and so we would still be human without it-but in fact, every concrete human being has such a desire instilled in him or her by God. Rahner argues that just because such a desire is supernatural does not mean it cannot also be universal. Grace need not be rare just because it is gratuitous. While Rahner recognizes a natural orientation to God, this is not sufficient for his purposes. Although it is an openness, it is not an unconditional ordination for grace, for God. Such an ordination is not part of pure nature but is supernatural, even though in this concrete historical order it is a universal element of our concrete human nature. It is present as offer, even when we reject it through sin. (Fs)

121a On Rahner's notion of the supernatural existential, grace is always and everywhere on offer, in transcendental mode, that is, as offer within human consciousness. This has important consequences, especially in interreligious dialogue. It led Rahner to develop the notion of "anonymous Christians" as a way of speaking about salvation outside the church. However, some have questioned whether this undermines the historical mediation of grace, notably through the church and sacraments. Johannes Baptist Metz, a student of Rahner, has been very strong on this point. For him, Rahner "wins the race without even running it," by avoiding the difficulties raised in the issue of historical mediation.2 In a sense Rahner's notion of the supernatural existential seeks to develop a mediating principle between grace and nature, by giving the existential qualities of both grace (as supernatural) and nature (as universal). It raises the question of why such a mediating principle is needed. (Fs) (notabene)

Stichwort: Gnade

Autor, Quelle: Ormerod, Neil, Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Titel: Gnade - Lonergan

Index: Schau Gottes, Gnade; B. Lonergan; Ausgang: Intellekt; Frage nach Gott; obediential potency (oboedientiale Potenz); ein Verlangen - 2 Ziele: proportional zur Natur - übernatürlich; Sublation; Cajetan (2 Verlangen)

Kurzinhalt: Still, while intellect reveals a potential for the beatific vision, the potential is "obediential"; that is, it lies beyond the proportionate means of the intellect ... Thus Lonergan allows for two ends, one proportionate, the other supernatural ...

Text: 121b Finally, we consider the position of Lonergan on our "natural desire to see God."1 Lonergan begins by distinguishing between two meanings of the word "natural." First, it is used as distinct from supernatural, something that is beyond the powers of nature; second, when we speak of a natural desire, it is used in distinction from an elicited desire, which is an act of desiring some presenting object. A natural desire, then, pertains not to acts of elicited desire (e.g., in faith we may desire the beatific vision) but the potential orientation of the nature that is manifested in its acts. When Lonergan speaks of a natural desire to see God in God's essence, he uses the word "natural" in both senses. To speak of an elicited desire for the beatific vision as a natural desire would be to claim a natural appreciation of a supernatural good, the beatific vision, which would deny the supernaturality of that vision. Similarly, if one concludes from the fact of a natural desire to an exigence for the beatific vision, one again denies the supernatural quality of that vision. (Fs)

121c For Lonergan, the evidence for a natural desire is found in our human intellect, or what we have described as the human search for meaning, truth, and value. As soon as we know that there is a God-attainable through the natural light of intellect according to Vatican I (DS 3004)-we seek meaning, "What is God?" But only the beatific vision is a complete response to that question. Such questioning is natural; it reveals a human potency, the intellect, which is a radical tendency to "know everything about everything." Still, while intellect reveals a potential for the beatific vision, the potential is "obediential"; that is, it lies beyond the proportionate means of the intellect to achieve and can only be received "in obedience" as gift. The proportionate end of human knowledge is the universe of sensible being. Thus Lonergan allows for two ends, one proportionate, the other supernatural, arising from a single desire. These stand in relationship to each other since our "quest for complete knowledge can reach its term only when we know God per essentiam."2 Grace truly perfects and completes nature. Still, a natural perfection and beatitude are possible without the beatific vision. The language that Lonergan later would use to describe the relationship between the proportionate and supernatural ends would be "sublation": "what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet so far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context."3 (Fs)

122a Lonergan contrasts his position with that of Cajetan. For Cajetan, a natural desire must be fulfilled by natural means. Since there is no natural means for attaining the beatific vision, there can be no natural desire to see God. Next, Cajetan argues that there is a natural desire, but its object is to know God as the first cause, as existent, not for knowledge of God in his essence. Finally, he argues that there may be a natural elicited desire to see God, one dependent on divinely revealed effects. Thus, for Cajetan there are two desires, one natural, a potency of the nature but with a natural object; the other natural as elicited but with a supernatural object. Cajetan sought to protect the gratuity of grace but in doing so produced a human being with two desires and two ends "at the price of obscuring the relation between the natural desire to see God and its ultimate fulfillment in the beatific vision."4
122b Finally, in response to the position of de Lubac, Lonergan strongly asserts the possibility of God creating a world order where grace is not available:

all things are possible to God on condition that no internal contradiction is involved. But a world-order without grace does not involve an internal contradiction. Therefore a world-order without grace is possible to God and so concretely possible.5

122c While Lonergan accepts that it is fitting for rational creatures to have the beatific vision as their end, it is not necessary. On the other hand, he agrees with de Lubac that the notion of pure nature is hardly a central notion in the theology of grace and loses its significance once one abandons the conceptualist assumptions of Cajetan. (Fs)

123a As can be seen from the above discussion, the problem of working with the grace/nature distinction raises some very difficult questions that have exercised the minds of some of our greatest theologians. However, some simple insights might help the student approaching this for the first time. Some of the difficulties we create for ourselves arise with the language we use and the images behind that language. We often speak of the "religious" or "sacred" sphere in contrast to the "secular" sphere. But the image of contrasting spheres is not helpful. How do "spheres" relate to one another? Each is self-enclosed and complete. Try instead the image of "dimension," that is, the sacred dimension of things. Rather than splitting reality into disconnected spheres, the language of dimensions implies a unified reality with several distinct attributes or orders. A sacred dimension may be manifest at any time, in any place; a sacred sphere will be cut off and isolated from the nonsacred. Grace and the supernatural are not a distinct reality but a potential dimension of all reality, something Catholic theology recognizes in its approach to the sacraments. (Fs)

Stichwort: Gnade

Autor, Quelle: Lonergan, Bernard, Methode in der Theologie

Titel: Gratia operans, cooperans

Index: Funktionale Spezialisierung; Dialektik: Akt - dynamischer Zustand; religiöse Bekehrung; gratia operans, cooperans; Herzs aus Fleisch, Stein; Unterströmung des existentiellen Bewußtseins

Kurzinhalt: Religiöse Bekehrung ist Betroffenwerden von dem, was uns unbedingt angeht. Sie ist Sich-überweltlich-verlieben... eine solche Hingabe nicht als ein Akt, sondern als ein dynamischer Zustand, der den folgenden Akten vorgängig und deren Urgrund ist.

Text: Religiöse Bekehrung (eü)

18/X Religiöse Bekehrung ist Betroffenwerden von dem, was uns unbedingt angeht. Sie ist Sich-überweltlich-verlieben. Sie ist völlige und dauernde Selbst-Hingabe ohne Bedingungen, Einschränkungen und Vorbehalte. Aber sie ist eine solche Hingabe nicht als ein Akt, sondern als ein dynamischer Zustand, der den folgenden Akten vorgängig und deren Urgrund ist. In der Rückschau enthüllt sich die religiöse Bekehrung als eine Unterströmung des existentiellen Bewußtseins, als die schicksalhafte Annahme einer Berufung zur Heiligkeit, vielleicht auch als eine zunehmende Einfachheit und Passivität des Gebetslebens. (244; Fs; tblStw: Bekehrung; tblStw: Gnade ) (notabene)

19/X Religiöse Bekehrung wird im Kontext unterschiedlicher religiöser Überlieferungen verschieden gedeutet. Für Christen ist sie die Liebe Gottes, die in unsere Herzen ausgegossen ist durch den Heiligen Geist, der uns gegeben ist. Sie ist Geschenk der Gnade, und seit den Tagen des hl. Augustinus wird zwischen wirkender (gratia operans) und mitwirkender Gnade (gratis cooperans) unterschieden. Die wirkende Gnade ersetzt das Herz von Stein durch ein Herz aus Fleisch, eine Ersetzung, die über dem Horizont eines Herzens von Stein liegt. Die mitwirkende Gnade ist das Herz aus Fleisch, das in guten Werken durch menschliche Freiheit wirksam wird. Wirkende Gnade ist religiöse Bekehrung. Mitwirkende Gnade ist die Wirksamkeit der Bekehrung, die schrittweise Hinbewegung auf eine völlige und vollständige Umwandlung des gesamten eigenen Lebens und Fühlens, aller Gedanken, Worte, Taten und Unterlassungen.1 (244f; Fs) (notabene)

20/X Wie intellektuelle und moralische Bekehrung ist auch die religiöse Bekehrung eine Modalität der Selbst-Transzendenz. Intellektuelle Bekehrung wendet sich zur Wahrheit, die durch kognitive Selbst-Transzendenz erreicht wird. Moralische Bekehrung wendet sich den Werten zu, die durch eine reale Selbst-Transzendenz erfaßt, behauptet und verwirklicht werden. Religiöse Bekehrung erfolgt zu einem völligen In-Liebe-Sein als dem wirkenden Grund aller Selbst-Transzendenz, ob im Streben nach Wahrheit, ob in der Verwirklichung menschlicher Werte oder in der Ausrichtung auf das Universum und auf dessen Urgrund und Ziel, die ein Mensch annimmt. (245; Fs) (notabene)

Stichwort: Gnade

Autor, Quelle: Thomas, Aquin von (Hg), F12_106 - Vom Gesetz des Evangeliums oder dem Neuen Gesetz

Titel: Thomas: Gnade als Gesetz - Gesetz als Gnade

Index: Gnade als Gesetz - Gesetz als Gnade; das Neue Gesetz als Gnade des Heiligen Geistes; Gnade als zweite Natur und Gesetz Christi; Heteronomie d. vom Geiste erfassten Menschen; Gnade als Licht

Kurzinhalt: Gesetz und Gnade sind nur noch insofern „äußere" Hilfen zu nennen, als ihr Ursprung außerhalb des Menschen in Gott und in Christus liegt ... Für diese Menschen hört Gesetz auf, Gesetz zu sein, Pflicht wird innerste Neigung, Opfer wird zur seligen ...

Text: 9c Gesetz ist also Hilfe, Wegweiser. So verschieden demnach die Wege sein können, so verschieden werden die Wegweiser sein. Das „Neue Gesetz" ist der von Gott Selbst aufgestellte Wegweiser, der den „Neuen Weg" zeigt. Das Ziel ist dasselbe wie das des Alten Bundes (S. 24), der neue Weg aber ist Christus: „ICH bin der Weg", sagt Er von Sich Selbst (Jo 14,6). Daher gilt vom „Neuen Gesetz" dasselbe, was wir von Christus, dem menschgewordenen Gottessohne, sagen müssen: Es ist „im höchsten Grade geistig" (S. 12); es ist „das Gesetz der Freiheit" (S. 46), „denn schon — meint Thomas (S. 53) — stand die Zeit vollkommener Freiheit unmittelbar bevor, so daß alles, was in sich nicht notwendig zur Tugend gehört, völlig ihrem [der Jünger] freien Ermessen überlassen werden konnte". Das alles aber wird überstrahlt von der das innerste Wesen Christi und Gottes offenbarenden Wirklichkeit der Gnade, dem „vornehmsten Geschenk" der Liebe Gottes (S. 163). Kein Wunder, daß das Neue Gesetz wie von selbst einmündet in den „weit erhabeneren Weg", von dem Paulus 1 Kor 12,31 spricht. (Fs; tblStw: Gnade)

10a So wird Gesetz Gnade, und Gnade wird Gesetz — wahrlich eine kühne Gleichung, wohl die kühnste Gleichung, die je in der Geschichte der Menschheit für die Sphäre des Sittlichen aufgestellt wurde. Nur zu begreiflich, daß — bei der menschlichen Schwäche für das verlockend Rationale des Buchstabens — selbst im neuen christlichen Äon immer wieder die Versuchung auftauchte, das Gesetz stärker zu betonen als die Gnade und so in den „Geist der Knechtschaft und der Furcht" (Röm 8,15) zurückzufallen. Diese Gefahr signalisiert Thomas durch zwei große Warnungstafeln. So schreibt er gleich im zweiten Artikel der ersten Frage dieses Bandes: „Auch der Buchstabe des Evangeliums würde töten, wenn nicht innerlich die heilende Glaubensgnade zugegen wäre" (S. 9). Ausdrücklich stellt er im selben Artikel fest: Glaubensurkunden und Gebote sind zweitrangig, entscheidend ist „die innerlich verliehene Gnade des Heiligen Geistes", der mit der Gnade erst das vorbehaltlose Ja zu dem im „Gesetz" ausgesprochenen Willen des Vaters schenkt. (Fs) (notabene)

10b Die zweite Warnungstafel vor dem dem Evangelium innerlich fremden Buchstabengeist und der daraus folgenden rein formalen Deutung oder Anwendung des Neuen Gesetzes stellt Thomas auf in 107, 4, wo er mit einem ernsten Worte Augustins vor der willkürlichen Häufung von Vorschriften warnt, „damit der Wandel der Gläubigen nicht zu sehr belastet werde" und die Lage der Christen schließlich nicht unerträglicher werde, als die der Juden war (S. 39 f.). (Fs)

E10c Eigentlich hört nun das Gesetz auf, zu den äußeren Hilfen zu zählen. Gesetz und Gnade sind nur noch insofern „äußere" Hilfen zu nennen, als ihr Ursprung außerhalb des Menschen in Gott und in Christus liegt. In Wirklichkeit wirkt die Gnade als „zweite Natur" und ist das „Gesetz" Christi so in den Willen des Begnadeten eingegangen, mit ihm eins geworden, daß es gar nicht mehr als Gesetz erlebt wird, seinen Charakter als Gesetz völlig verliert. Auf diesen radikalen Wandel in der Natur des Gesetzes selbst weist Thomas sofort im ersten Artikel des Traktates mit Energie hin (S. 4 f.) und stützt sich dabei auf ein Wort des Hebräerbriefes, der sich seinerseits auf eine Weissagung des Propheten Jeremias beruft: „Ich werde Meine Satzungen in ihr Inneres legen, spricht der Herr, in ihr Herz werde Ich sie schreiben." Immer neu stellt Thomas diesen Immanenz-Charakter des Neuen Gesetzes heraus (vgl. S. 5 f., 9 f., 26 f., 31 40 44 67). Schon für Augustin, den Thomas in der Antwort des ersten Artikels anführt, stehen sich Altes und Neues Gesetz gegenüber wie das Gesetz auf den kalten, steinernen Tafeln des Moses und das Gesetz des Glaubens mitten im lebendigen, liebenden Herzen der Gläubigen (vgl. auch 106, 2 Zu 3). So wandelt sich die Heteronomie des Gesetzes in die relative Autonomie des vom Heiligen Geiste erfaßten Menschen, die als Teilhabe an der absoluten Autonomie Gottes aus der Gnade fließt und den Menschen, der durch die Gnade „ein Geist wird mit Gott" (1 Kor 6,17), jeder Kreatur überlegen macht (I 112, 1 Zu 4: Bd. 8). Für diese Menschen hört Gesetz auf, Gesetz zu sein, Pflicht wird innerste Neigung, Opfer wird zur seligen Notwendigkeit, Gebot wird in der Erfüllung zum Gebet, Furcht wandelt sich in Liebe („Die vollkommene Liebe treibt die Furcht aus" — 1 Jo 4,18), in der Liebe aber wird der heilige Wille Gottes zum ausschließlichen „Gesetz" des menschlichen Lebens, das göttliche Ebenbild im Menschen nähert sich seinem Urbild, insofern nun auch der menschliche Wille gnadenhaft eins wird mit der Lex aeterna, dem „ewigen Gesetz", so wie dieses „ewige Gesetz" eins ist mit dem Willen und dem Wesen Gottes selbst. Auf dem Wege über das Neue Gesetz kehrt der Mensch zurück zu seinem Ursprung. „Denn das Gesetz (das Alte) ist durch Moses gegeben; Gnade und Wahrheit (charis kai alEtheia — der Inbegriff des „Neuen Gesetzes") ist durch Jesus Christus geworden" (Jo 1,17). (Fs)

12a „Vornehmlich ist das Neue Gesetz Gnade des Heiligen Geistes" (S. 12). Daher folgt völlig organisch und ohne jede innere Zäsur auf den Traktat über das „Neue Gesetz" der über die Gnade. Ja, man könnte die drei Fragen über das Neue Gesetz geradezu als Einleitung zum Gnadentraktat verstehen, gewissermaßen als die Verankerung der Gnadenwirklichkeit in der konkreten, von Gott gelenkten Heilsgeschichte der Menschheit. Alles, was Thomas in diesen 54 Artikeln sagt, ist wie ein Hoheslied auf die absolute Spontaneität der zuvorkommenden Liebe Gottes. Durch die Gnade hebt Gott den Menschen zu Sich empor, macht ihn stark zur innigsten Teilnahme an Seinem persönlichsten, dreifaltigen Leben. Das Endliche wird fähig des Unendlichen, finitum capax infiniti, der Mensch wird „Gottes mächtig durch die Gnade". Das ist nach Thomas nicht einmal so wunderbar, da doch die Seele des Menschen von vornherein, „von Natur aus" auf die Gnade entworfen (S. 206), von Gott Selbst zur innigsten Gemeinschaft, zur „Kommunion" mit Gott bestimmt ist durch die Gnade (S. 150). Durch sie wird der Mensch in der Wurzel seines Seins geheilt und geheiligt. Dabei ist jede Gnade der Eigenart des einzelnen denkbar vollkommen angepaßt. Sie kommt nicht als ein Fremdes in die Seele, sondern als der Seele eigenstes Eigen (S. 26). Nie also bedeutet die Gnade geistige Vergewaltigung. Unendlich stark, weil sie aus der unendlichen Kraft der Liebe Gottes stammt, ist sie doch wieder unendlich zart, weil sie im Herzen des Vaters ihre Heimat hat, und wir mit ihr. So bedeutet sie auch keine irgendwie geartete Beeinträchtigung der menschlichen Freiheit, ganz im Gegenteil: unter dem sanften Walten der Gnade blüht die Freiheit des Menschen erst auf zu ihrer letzten strahlenden Kraft, in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei — „zur Freiheit der Herrlichkeit der Söhne Gottes" (Röm 8, 21). (Fs)

12b Die Gnade ist ein „Licht" — wie oft wählt Thomas diese Bezeichnung, die in seiner Sicht viel mehr ist als bloße Metapher oder Symbol (vgl. Sachverzeichnis) —, und dieses Licht heilt, kräftigt, durchklärt den ganzen inneren Menschen (S. 122 f.), legt die geistigen Energien frei, die von der Schöpfung her in ihm schlummern, ent-bindet alle Kräfte der Seele, die von der Sünde her mit mancherlei unwürdigen Fesseln gebunden waren. Die Gnade ist wie ein Feuer; auch dieses Bild ist Thomas nicht fremd. Das Feuer scheint in die Natur des von ihm durchglühten Eisens einzugehen, es in sich selbst einzuverwandeln. So wird das von Natur dunkle Eisen licht, das von Natur kalte Eisen wird heiß, das von Natur harte Eisen wird weich. Ganz analog sind die Wirkungen der Gnade in der Seele des Menschen. Unter ihrem geheimnisvollen Einfluß schwinden die für uns selbst und für unsere Mitmenschen oft unheimlichen Dunkelheiten unserer Seele mehr und mehr: „Wir werden verwandelt in dasselbe Bild (Gottes) von Klarheit zu Klarheit wie durch den Geist des Herrn" (2 Kor 3,18); die Hybris des kalten Verstandes wird besiegt durch die zur Metanoia, zum radikalen Umdenken entschlossene, ganz neue, ganz demütige, ganz göttliche Liebe des Herzens; die Härte des widerspenstigen Willens, der sich aufbäumt gegen jede Bevormundung von außen, wird abgelöst durch das Wunder einer alle inneren Widerstände überwindenden, vorbehaltlosen Hingabe, die dem leisesten Wink Gottes offensteht. Wer auch nur in etwa ahnt, wie schwer der Geist des Menschen, weil er Geist ist, sich selbst aufgibt, den mag es nicht wundernehmen, daß Thomas die Bekehrung eines Menschen höher stellt als die Schöpfung einer neuen Welt (S. 202) und die geringste, dem einzelnen von Gott geschenkte Gnade höher schätzt als die im gesamten Universum aufgespeicherten natürlichen Werte (S. 203). (Fs; tblStw: Metapher) (notabene)
13a Ohne Gnade aber bleibt die Natur des Menschen ein Torso, bleiben Verstand und Wille, Eros und Sexus unerlöst, voneinander isoliert, bleibt das doppelte Gesetz in den Gliedern (Röm 7,23), bleiben „zwei Seelen wohnen in der Brust" (Goethe), kommen weder die einzelnen noch die Völker untereinander zur inneren Klarheit und Ausgeglichenheit, zur Eintracht, zum Frieden. Ohne Gnade sein heißt leben „ohne Hoffnung und ohne Gott in dieser Welt" (Eph 2, 12). (Fs) (notabene)

13b Gegenüber diesen Feststellungen von letzter Wucht und Dringlichkeit bleibt die göttliche Verwaltung der Gnade, wie Thomas sie im einzelnen darzulegen versucht, nur noch insofern bedeutsam, als erst aus ihr die ganze Länge und Breite und Höhe und Tiefe der „alle Erkenntnis übersteigenden Liebe Christi" (Eph 3, 18 f.) in den göttlichen Dimensionen des Gnaden-Kosmos mit seinen besonderen Gesetzen, Gesetzen der Liebe und der Freiheit, aufleuchtet. Wie für das Gesamtwerk des hl. Thomas, so gilt gerade für seinen Gnadentraktat, daß Gott in ihm wirklich „das A und das O, der Erste und der Letzte, der Anfang und das Ende" ist (Offb 22, 13). Wahrlich, ein einziges Hoheslied „zum Lobe der Herrlichkeit Seiner Gnade" (Eph 1, 12). (Fs)