Autor: Scheler, Max

Buch: Ressentiment

Titel: Ressentiment

Stichwort: Einführung 2: Ressentiment: spezifische Strukturen; unbewusste Umdeutung eines positiven Wertes in einen negativen

Kurzinhalt: ... three specific structures of ressentiment: 1. A subconscious emotive detraction of a positive value into a negative value. 2. Ranks among values. 3. Intersubjective comparing.

Textausschnitt: II. SPECIFIC EMOTIVE STRUCTURES OF RESENTMENT

9a Within this general description of ressentiment one can discern three specific structures of ressentiment:

1. A subconscious emotive detraction of a positive value into a negative value.
2. Ranks among values.
3. Intersubjective comparing.

Let us look into these specific components.

1. A subconscious emotive detraction of a positive value into a negative value (eü)

1. Ressentiment persists and perseveres, it was stated, because of an abiding impotency which blocks any possible realization of particular positive values. This, in turn, lets the venom of ressentiment permeate the person's whole inner life and experience, so that the order of values and the order of loving positive values is in a state of disarray. Reasoning about values can not stop the emotive disorder to occur and continue. It might at best recognize the disorder when, for instance, a ressentiment-subject says, "There is something wrong with me." But this is very rare among those subjects, and it neither nullifies the experience of the disorder felt among positive and negative values, nor does it help to rationally recognize the higher values to be attained, i.e., to let the grapes simply what they are, namely, sweet. A insight in emotional experiences is at a rational inventory of oneself. Rational logic is no cure in a flawed experience of values.

9b But there is another side to the detraction lowering of unattainable positive values occurring in ressentiment-feelings. (Fs)

9c While the failure to realize a certain positive value, and while this continues to irk the ressentiment-subject, the feeling of ressentiment, to boot, also raises those values it indeed can realize; that is, those values that the impotency allows the ressentiment-subject to attain: Giving up trying to reach the unattainable sweetness of the grapes, and the fox's self-deception that they are sour anyway, is more valuable to him than granting the grapes their due. In ordered value-feelings this can also occur because, no matter whether the grapes are sweet or sour, they are simply not attainable for an ordinary person, and this settles the issue altogether. However, in the presence of ressentiment-feelings, the disvalue of physical impotency is not admitted. It is even ennobled in the self-deception that they are sour. But -- and this is the very "tragic" in all resentment feelings -- throughout the process of the emotional inversion of value-detraction and value-elevation there remains translucent, no matter how faintly, the true order of values and their ranks, in the background of the entire value-conflict.

10a This simultaneous value detraction and elevation may be graphed in the following way, where "I" stands for the impotence in the feelings of ressentiment and "V" for the value detracted from its proper level:

Autor: Scheler, Max

Buch: Ressentiment

Titel: Ressentiment

Stichwort:

Kurzinhalt:

Textausschnitt: 2. Ranks among values (eü)
10b
2. In order to bring into focus the ranks that hold among values we must first look at some details of the nature of values themselves. This will provide us with a platform from which we can see the nature of value deceptions and value illusions which constantly plague all people charged with ressentiment. (Fs)
11a What are values? There is a great deal of mention of values in present-day society. It seems that many people, more often than not in managerial or political higher offices, believe that talking about values implies knowing already what they are. The talk about values was also fashionable in Germany during Scheler's life-time. The determination of the nature of values was also at that time, as in ours today, in need to be staked out. It was one of the many life-long areas of Scheler's pursuits, in glaring contrast, we must add, to the majority of twentieth century philosophers who, like Heidegger, sometimes misconstrue entirely the nature of value-being by referring to only one or two classes of them. Being at the threshold of the twenty-first century, one can be pretty sure that twentieth century philosophy will likely be characterized in the future by its conspicuous lack of research and concern into the being of values, and the foundations of ethics. (Fs)
11b First of all, values are given to us in feeling them. True, they can be thought of, and willed, but only after they have passed through feeling them. This is analogous to colors, says Scheler's, which can only be seen. Just as colors are given to us "in" seeing them, or sounds "in" hearing them, values are first given to us "in" feeling them. Note, however, that colors and sounds, like values, can also be present to thinking and observation. However, this is only pursuant to the respective primary acts of seeing, hearing, and feeling respectively. (Fs)
11c Feeling, on the other hand, is different from acts of seeing and hearing in that it does not occur exclusively in sense perception as seeing and hearing do. It is true that we can also feel a number of values with the senses, like pain given in the sense of touch. But feelings can be entirely personal also in which cases they are not given in any of the five senses. Injustice, for instance, is felt in a personal, not sensory feeling. (Fs)
11d Furthermore, values are, like colors, independent of the things they belong to. The value "useful" may pertain to a piece of furniture or to a pen I am taking notes with. Just as the vermilion of a rock fish may also be the color of a car. This independence that values have of their substrates has far reaching consequences. Let it be mentioned only that the independence values have of things, and vice versa, is an ontological basis for all negotiable values in economics, say, those negotiated in a stock-market. In this regard, the independence holding between values and things is itself rather useful for human beings to pursue technical as well as technological aims, etc. (Fs)
12a But said independence has also unfortunate effects in society. In society, values are believed to be mostly quantifiable. Their quantifiability is used to bring them under control mechanisms, such as in programs designed to stem inflation, in order to acceptable value conditions can be sustained. We can without difficulty see at this point that the controllability of quantifiable values is based in their independence of things. This state of affairs makes it possible that the global human house-hold (eco-nomics) can be kept in relative order, or not. (Fs)
12b The excessive use of quantifiable values in modern society implies the forbidding tendency to look at the entire realm of values, including values which are not at all quantifiable, as manageable values. The value of persons itself, which is not quantifiable, has become subject to being rated by quantifiable work hours and success. In such cases, not only is the unique self-value of an individual person ignored, but also the entire realm of values is subordinated to quantification. The education of children is, unfortunately, no exception to this value-deception, because education is largely seen to be effective first if there is enough money for it available. The dedicated teacher is subsumed to this contortion of a cultural value. (Fs)
12c Scheler foresaw this untimely development in light of pursuit to bring into bold relief the dignity and unique value of the individual person. He stressed that the concept of "person" is totally indifferent to race, gender, ethnicity, to being rich or poor, and to individual beliefs. And he suspected there to be a stealthy societal resentment creeping among those who lack fullness of personality but compensate their hollow selves by judging others by the quantity of their work and success, all independent of social stations. It is therefore false to assume that only socially disadvantaged persons can suffer from ressentiment. There is an tragic lack of love in society. Indeed, at the end of the text before us, Scheler charges society with quantifying the most precious quality human beings have, love itself, in that love of the individual person is being replaced by a quantified love for humanity expressed in fund-raisings for this our humanity. The value of individual and undivided samaritarian love of the other -- for the sake of which the young Scheler turned as a teenager toward Catholicism period (his mother was Jewish, his father Lutheran) is giving way to a false humanitarianism. Both the value-independence and the givenness of values in feelings we just discussed suggest that values have criteria of rankings. Before we list the value-ranks, we wish to mention some criteria which are indices for the heights and levels these ranks have among each other. The criteria of the heights of values run through all ranks. They are:
1. The higher a value-rank is, the less its values are divisible and controllable, and the less they depend on material.
2. The higher a value-rank is, the more it lasts in time.
3. The higher a value-rank is, the less its values can be willed and managed.
4. The higher a value-rank is, the more its values generate personal contentment, happiness, and inner peace.
13a All valuations we make in our lives are applicable to these criteria. Values themselves divide in five, spectral value-ranks. Like individual values themselves, the five value-ranks themselves, too, have an analogy to colorations, because colorations, too, rest on a few ranks of spectral colors, without which there can not be colorations of things. (Fs)
14a The five value-ranks are not specifically treated in the present text, but underlie it all the way through. They are treated in detail in Scheler's aforementioned Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, and his essay "Ordo Amoris." In chapters III, IV, and V of the present text some of them are seen in light of ressentiment feelings. (Fs)
14b Starting with the lowest rank and continuing in ascending order, the ranks of values are as follows:
14c The lowest rank contains all values given in tactile feelings of the body. They range from the value of bodily "comfort" down to "discomfort." We share these values with animals but, according to the independence values have of their substrates, what is comfortable to one species may not be so for another, and what is comfortable to one individual is not necessarily comfortable to another. (Fs)
14d The next higher rank ranges from the value of "useful" down to the negative value o "not useful." These are pragmatic values and are connected with things, work and anything expedient, as the Greek word "pragma" suggests. They also pertain to technology as the Greek word "techne," meaning "cunning of hand," "craft," "art," suggests. We also [eg: share?] these values with animals, say, when birds are building their nests trying to find most useful material for this. But with humans the pragmatic value-rank encompasses much more. It spans the usefulness of the atom and the exploration of outer space; indeed they function in utilizing the sun's energy. The emotive preferring of the values of these two lowest ranks, i.e., leaning toward them, over higher ones is rampant in a society typified by an excessive cultivation of the human body and utility values. These excesses are reflected in exorbitant sums of money and time spent annually in industrialized nations for sports, entertainment, tools and gadgets, everything of which amounting to an international multi-billion dollar industry. The preference of the tow lowest value-ranks is unfortunate in comparison to the modest funds available for cultural values like global education, the arts, and equal distribution of nutrition on our planet, something which Scheler regarded to be one of the highest priorities of moral behavior a person-to-person love. He once referred to the preference of the lower two ranks over all others as the deceiving "star of society." (Fs) (notabene)
15a What distinguishes the two lower value-ranks mentioned from all other ranks is also their localizability in organs and things. Discomfort of body pain is as localizable as is a thing's usefulness. (Fs)
1. Kommentar (23.03.13): Lonergan: Wertskale aufgrund der Analyse der Intentionalität -- Scheler: Wertskale aufgrund von "Sichtbarkeit" -- dennoch stimmen beide überraschend überein.
15b The next higher rank contains "life values" in two ways: They either pertain to the function and appearance of life and nature, on the one hand, or to human heroism, on the other. They range from the value of "noble" down to "deficient" or "bad." A knight riding a horse, or an old oak tree, have a noble aura about them, whereas the appearance of a pragmatic thing like a computer does not. The life values inherent in heroic actions must serve at least in part the preservation of life. What distinguishes rank of life-values from the former two lower ranks is that they are not localizable. They spread through an entire organism as health, fatigue, feelings of oncoming death do; or the nobleness of an heroic action is not a part of such action but suffuses it from its beginning to its end and beyond its presence. According to this order thus far given, it is not surprising, that for Scheler life values of agriculture and environment are higher than both pragmatic technological and sensible values. (Fs)
15c The fourth highest rank contains mental and cultural values given only to the person. There are three kinds of them: Aesthetic values, which encompass the values of "beautiful" down to "ugly," legal values of "right" and "wrong," and the value of the "cognition of truth."
15d The highest value-rank spans the "holy" and "unholy." Its values, too, can only be felt by a person. (Fs)

Autor: Scheler, Max

Buch: Ressentiment

Titel: Ressentiment

Stichwort: Einführung 1: Ressentiment allgemein: die emotive Struktur (3 Bestimmungen); 1) Wurzel v. R.: Ohmacht (impotency; physische, soziale, geistige usw.); 2) Unwertgefühle; 3) Unterschied zu Wut-Aktionen usw.; Beispiel: Fuchs u. d. Trauben (Äsop)

Kurzinhalt: Ressentiment is an incurable, persistent feeling of hating and despising which occurs in certain individuals and groups. It takes its root in equally incurable impotencies or weaknesses that those subjects constantly suffer from.

Textausschnitt: I. THE EMOTIVE STRUCTURE OF RESSENTIMENT IN GENERAL

6a What, precisely, is ressentiment? The general answer to the question is threefold.
1. Ressentiment is an incurable, persistent feeling of hating and despising which occurs in certain individuals and groups. It takes its root in equally incurable impotencies or weaknesses that those subjects constantly suffer from. These impotencies generate either individual or collective, but always negative emotive attitudes. They can permeate a whole culture, era, and an entire moral system. The feeling of ressentiment leads to false moral judgments made on other people who are devoid of this feeling. Such judgments are not infrequently accompanied by rash, at times fanatical claims of truth generated by the impotency this feeling comes from. There are various kinds of impotencies from which, strangely enough, the very strength of ressentiment feelings well up. They can be psychic, mental, social, or physical impotencies, disadvantages, weaknesses or deficiencies of various kinds. The individuals and groups concerned suffer from a blockage to communicate with others. They tend to come on slow and, if at all, they can hardly vent what keeps on plaguing them. (Fs)

2. Any feeling of ressentiment stemming from the impotency in a ressentiment-subject is accompanied by hidden feelings of self-disvalue over against others. The overwhelming dissimilarity between a ressentiment-subject and other people causes a disorder in value experiences and of all feelings conjoined with these disarranged values. In a marked contrast to such a ressentiment-subject, an individual of strong personality has no need to compare himself with his fellow humans, even if they happen to be superior in specific respects and abilities. The strong person is always ready and willing to accept values higher than those he represents. Therefore, no ressentiment can come up. Because of this emotive readiness, [eg: he?] is not easily embarrassed or ashamed about himself. Feelings of resentment, however, are irritated by the unattainability of positive values that others represent. Therefore, the inner experiences with others and of himself are in constant disarray. There is always present in ressentiment a disorder of the heart or a "désordre du coeur." That is, ressentiment is a state of constant aberration from the order of values, from the order of feelings and of love in which acts values are first given, i.e., from the "ordo amoris" or the "ordre du coeur." All this amounts to a damaged moral tenor of the individual person constantly charged with ressentiment feelings. (Fs)

7a
3. The constant state of ressentiment is distinguished sharply from furious reactions or outbursts of anger. Whenever a prosaic resentment-feeling finds satisfaction by way of, say, successful revenge and retaliation, there is no resentment proper at hand. It is therefore not the case that there is ressentiment in those who act out various types of terrorism, we are so familiar with in our time. Types of terrorism, such as murdering people because of hate, of holding hostages, of placing explosives under parked cars, or the terrorism of devastating whatever may be nearby, etc., happen as a rule acted because criminals want to find an inner fulfillment in their revengeful terrorism since there are little or no other means to this end. While persons committing acts of violence may entertain a prosaic resentment, one must, reading Scheler's text, come to the conclusion that throughout terrorism resentment is prone to be found among those who do not place bombs to kill, etc., but among those who stay behind such acts. Thus, ressentiment-subjects are often to be found among sympathizers of violence rather than among the criminals themselves doing violence.

8a Let us illustrate the difference between ressentiment and resentment by two examples taken from literature. (Fs)

8b The short story of one of Scheler's favorite writers, Edgar Allen Poe ( 1809- 1849), "The Cask of Amontillado" may tells us of the revenge taken by one whose personal honor had been seriously injured. Under the pretense of fun, he later on decides to tie his offender to a wall of a wine cellar, where they had been drinking. Having done so, he then starts to wall him up from the front, slowly and without mercy, each brick increasingly enjoying his feelings of revenge. When the last one is laid in place and the offender walled up to die of thirst, suffocation and starvation, the revenge is consumed, and no resentment can well up again. In ressentiment proper, however, no such gratification of revenge occurs. This is because the impulse to revenge, but no revenge itself, keeps on simmering without end and relief in sight. The impotency and powerlessness concerned blocks the venom of ressentiment from being washed away by a factual revenge. Of course, revenge like that in Poe's story, can in certain cases be fulfilled over and over again after each revenge taken and be suffused with ressentiment. This is the case with certain serial killers with whom the impulse to take revenge is not completely diluted by one kill alone. Resentment is so deep that it can well up again and again after each revenge taken. (Fs)

8c Another literary example helps us to come closer to ressentiment. It is Aesop's well known fable of "The Fox and the Grapes," which Scheler alludes to. There are the sweet grapes tempting the fox, but out of his reach. After leaping up and up to get a hold of some, the fox gives up trying. Leaving the scene, he convinces himself that those grapes were not sweet but sour anyway. Aesop's fable comes closer to ressentiment proper, because there is an impotency involved which is at the root of a value-deception. It is a physical impotency, which the fox can not overcome because he lacks the strength to jump high enough for the grasp of a grape. This makes the fox powerless to taste the grapes' sweetness. The powerlessness, in turn, makes him detract and diminish the value of their sweetness into "sour grapes."

Autor: Scheler, Max

Buch: Ressentiment

Titel: Ressentiment

Stichwort: Einführung 2: Ressentiment: unbewusste Umdeutung positiver Werte in negative; Tragik v. R.: die wahre Ordnung bleibt im Wertkonflikt erhalten

Kurzinhalt: ... the feeling of ressentiment, to boot, also raises those values it indeed can realize; that is, those values that the impotency allows the ressentiment-subject to attain: ...

Textausschnitt: II. SPECIFIC EMOTIVE STRUCTURES OF RESENTMENT

9a Within this general description of ressentiment one can discern three specific structures of ressentiment:

1. A subconscious emotive detraction of a positive value into a negative value.
2. Ranks among values.
3. Intersubjective comparing.
Let us look into these specific components.

1. A subconscious emotive detraction of a positive value into a negative value (eü)

1. Ressentiment persists and perseveres, it was stated, because of an abiding impotency which blocks any possible realization of particular positive values. This, in turn, lets the venom of ressentiment permeate the person's whole inner life and experience, so that the order of values and the order of loving positive values is in a state of disarray. Reasoning about values can not stop the emotive disorder to occur and continue. It might at best recognize the disorder when, for instance, a ressentiment-subject says, "There is something wrong with me." But this is very rare among those subjects, and it neither nullifies the experience of the disorder felt among positive and negative values, nor does it help to rationally recognize the higher values to be attained, i.e., to let the grapes simply what they are, namely, sweet. A insight in emotional experiences is at a rational inventory of oneself. Rational logic is no cure in a flawed experience of values. (Fs)

9b But there is another side to the detraction lowering of unattainable positive values occurring in ressentiment-feelings. (Fs)

9c While the failure to realize a certain positive value, and while this continues to irk the ressentiment-subject, the feeling of ressentiment, to boot, also raises those values it indeed can realize; that is, those values that the impotency allows the ressentiment-subject to attain: Giving up trying to reach the unattainable sweetness of the grapes, and the fox's self-deception that they are sour anyway, is more valuable to him than granting the grapes their due. In ordered value-feelings this can also occur because, no matter whether the grapes are sweet or sour, they are simply not attainable for an ordinary person, and this settles the issue altogether. However, in the presence of ressentiment-feelings, the disvalue of physical impotency is not admitted. It is even ennobled in the self-deception that they are sour. But -- and this is the very "tragic" in all resentment feelings -- throughout the process of the emotional inversion of value-detraction and value-elevation there remains translucent, no matter how faintly, the true order of values and their ranks, in the background of the entire value-conflict. (Fs)

10a This simultaneous value detraction and elevation may be graphed in the following way, where "I" stands for the impotence in the feelings of ressentiment and "V" for the value detracted from its proper level:

Autor: Scheler, Max

Buch: Ressentiment

Titel: Ressentiment

Stichwort: Einführung 3: Ressentiment: Hierarchie, Werte; Fühlen d. W.; W. als unabhänging v. Dingen (wie Farben); Übergewicht v. quantifizierbaren Werten; Kriterien für Werthierarchie; 5 Stufen; Körper, Nützlichkeit, Lebenswerte, kulturelle, religiöse W.

Kurzinhalt: 1. The higher a value-rank is, the less its values are divisible and controllable, and the less they depend on material. 2. The higher a value-rank is, the more it lasts in time. 3. The higher a value-rank is, the less its values can be willed and ...

Textausschnitt: 2. Ranks among values (eü)
10b

2. In order to bring into focus the ranks that hold among values we must first look at some details of the nature of values themselves. This will provide us with a platform from which we can see the nature of value deceptions and value illusions which constantly plague all people charged with ressentiment. (Fs)

11a What are values? There is a great deal of mention of values in present-day society. It seems that many people, more often than not in managerial or political higher offices, believe that talking about values implies knowing already what they are. The talk about values was also fashionable in Germany during Scheler's life-time. The determination of the nature of values was also at that time, as in ours today, in need to be staked out. It was one of the many life-long areas of Scheler's pursuits, in glaring contrast, we must add, to the majority of twentieth century philosophers who, like Heidegger, sometimes misconstrue entirely the nature of value-being by referring to only one or two classes of them. Being at the threshold of the twenty-first century, one can be pretty sure that twentieth century philosophy will likely be characterized in the future by its conspicuous lack of research and concern into the being of values, and the foundations of ethics. (Fs)

11b First of all, values are given to us in feeling them. True, they can be thought of, and willed, but only after they have passed through feeling them. This is analogous to colors, says Scheler's, which can only be seen. Just as colors are given to us "in" seeing them, or sounds "in" hearing them, values are first given to us "in" feeling them. Note, however, that colors and sounds, like values, can also be present to thinking and observation. However, this is only pursuant to the respective primary acts of seeing, hearing, and feeling respectively. (Fs)
11c Feeling, on the other hand, is different from acts of seeing and hearing in that it does not occur exclusively in sense perception as seeing and hearing do. It is true that we can also feel a number of values with the senses, like pain given in the sense of touch. But feelings can be entirely personal also in which cases they are not given in any of the five senses. Injustice, for instance, is felt in a personal, not sensory feeling. (Fs)

11d Furthermore, values are, like colors, independent of the things they belong to. The value "useful" may pertain to a piece of furniture or to a pen I am taking notes with. Just as the vermilion of a rock fish may also be the color of a car. This independence that values have of their substrates has far reaching consequences. Let it be mentioned only that the independence values have of things, and vice versa, is an ontological basis for all negotiable values in economics, say, those negotiated in a stock-market. In this regard, the independence holding between values and things is itself rather useful for human beings to pursue technical as well as technological aims, etc. (Fs)

12a But said independence has also unfortunate effects in society. In society, values are believed to be mostly quantifiable. Their quantifiability is used to bring them under control mechanisms, such as in programs designed to stem inflation, in order to acceptable value conditions can be sustained. We can without difficulty see at this point that the controllability of quantifiable values is based in their independence of things. This state of affairs makes it possible that the global human house-hold (eco-nomics) can be kept in relative order, or not. (Fs)

12b The excessive use of quantifiable values in modern society implies the forbidding tendency to look at the entire realm of values, including values which are not at all quantifiable, as manageable values. The value of persons itself, which is not quantifiable, has become subject to being rated by quantifiable work hours and success. In such cases, not only is the unique self-value of an individual person ignored, but also the entire realm of values is subordinated to quantification. The education of children is, unfortunately, no exception to this value-deception, because education is largely seen to be effective first if there is enough money for it available. The dedicated teacher is subsumed to this contortion of a cultural value. (Fs)

12c Scheler foresaw this untimely development in light of pursuit to bring into bold relief the dignity and unique value of the individual person. He stressed that the concept of "person" is totally indifferent to race, gender, ethnicity, to being rich or poor, and to individual beliefs. And he suspected there to be a stealthy societal resentment creeping among those who lack fullness of personality but compensate their hollow selves by judging others by the quantity of their work and success, all independent of social stations. It is therefore false to assume that only socially disadvantaged persons can suffer from ressentiment. There is an tragic lack of love in society. Indeed, at the end of the text before us, Scheler charges society with quantifying the most precious quality human beings have, love itself, in that love of the individual person is being replaced by a quantified love for humanity expressed in fund-raisings for this our humanity. The value of individual and undivided samaritarian love of the other -- for the sake of which the young Scheler turned as a teenager toward Catholicism period (his mother was Jewish, his father Lutheran) is giving way to a false humanitarianism. Both the value-independence and the givenness of values in feelings we just discussed suggest that values have criteria of rankings. Before we list the value-ranks, we wish to mention some criteria which are indices for the heights and levels these ranks have among each other. The criteria of the heights of values run through all ranks. They are:

1. The higher a value-rank is, the less its values are divisible and controllable, and the less they depend on material.

2. The higher a value-rank is, the more it lasts in time.
3. The higher a value-rank is, the less its values can be willed and managed.
4. The higher a value-rank is, the more its values generate personal contentment, happiness, and inner peace.

13a All valuations we make in our lives are applicable to these criteria. Values themselves divide in five, spectral value-ranks. Like individual values themselves, the five value-ranks themselves, too, have an analogy to colorations, because colorations, too, rest on a few ranks of spectral colors, without which there can not be colorations of things. (Fs)

14a The five value-ranks are not specifically treated in the present text, but underlie it all the way through. They are treated in detail in Scheler's aforementioned Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, and his essay "Ordo Amoris." In chapters III, IV, and V of the present text some of them are seen in light of ressentiment feelings. (Fs)

14b Starting with the lowest rank and continuing in ascending order, the ranks of values are as follows:

14c The lowest rank contains all values given in tactile feelings of the body. They range from the value of bodily "comfort" down to "discomfort." We share these values with animals but, according to the independence values have of their substrates, what is comfortable to one species may not be so for another, and what is comfortable to one individual is not necessarily comfortable to another. (Fs)

14d The next higher rank ranges from the value of "useful" down to the negative value o "not useful." These are pragmatic values and are connected with things, work and anything expedient, as the Greek word "pragma" suggests. They also pertain to technology as the Greek word "techne," meaning "cunning of hand," "craft," "art," suggests. We also [eg: share?] these values with animals, say, when birds are building their nests trying to find most useful material for this. But with humans the pragmatic value-rank encompasses much more. It spans the usefulness of the atom and the exploration of outer space; indeed they function in utilizing the sun's energy. The emotive preferring of the values of these two lowest ranks, i.e., leaning toward them, over higher ones is rampant in a society typified by an excessive cultivation of the human body and utility values. These excesses are reflected in exorbitant sums of money and time spent annually in industrialized nations for sports, entertainment, tools and gadgets, everything of which amounting to an international multi-billion dollar industry. The preference of the tow lowest value-ranks is unfortunate in comparison to the modest funds available for cultural values like global education, the arts, and equal distribution of nutrition on our planet, something which Scheler regarded to be one of the highest priorities of moral behavior a person-to-person love. He once referred to the preference of the lower two ranks over all others as the deceiving "star of society." (Fs) (notabene)

15a What distinguishes the two lower value-ranks mentioned from all other ranks is also their localizability in organs and things. Discomfort of body pain is as localizable as is a thing's usefulness. (Fs)

1. Kommentar (23.03.13): Lonergan: Wertskale aufgrund der Analyse der Intentionalität -- Scheler: Wertskale aufgrund von "Sichtbarkeit" -- dennoch stimmen beide überraschend überein.

15b The next higher rank contains "life values" in two ways: They either pertain to the function and appearance of life and nature, on the one hand, or to human heroism, on the other. They range from the value of "noble" down to "deficient" or "bad." A knight riding a horse, or an old oak tree, have a noble aura about them, whereas the appearance of a pragmatic thing like a computer does not. The life values inherent in heroic actions must serve at least in part the preservation of life. What distinguishes rank of life-values from the former two lower ranks is that they are not localizable. They spread through an entire organism as health, fatigue, feelings of oncoming death do; or the nobleness of an heroic action is not a part of such action but suffuses it from its beginning to its end and beyond its presence. According to this order thus far given, it is not surprising, that for Scheler life values of agriculture and environment are higher than both pragmatic technological and sensible values. (Fs)

15c The fourth highest rank contains mental and cultural values given only to the person. There are three kinds of them: Aesthetic values, which encompass the values of "beautiful" down to "ugly," legal values of "right" and "wrong," and the value of the "cognition of truth."
15d The highest value-rank spans the "holy" and "unholy." Its values, too, can only be felt by a person. (Fs)

Autor: Scheler, Max

Buch: Ressentiment

Titel: Ressentiment

Stichwort: Einführung 4: Ressentiment: intersubjektives Vergleichen; Kant (Anfang d. Menschheitsgeschichte); Wettbewerb - R. (Sklaverei); Beispiel: "arrivist" (der Streber); Illusion: Verbesserung durch Ethik; Scheelsucht

Kurzinhalt: A society beset with social discrepancies and competition is a most fertile ground for the psychic venom of ressentiment ... Whenever an individual is unable to face his self and instead loses himself and dissolves into external, societal relations to ...

Textausschnitt: 3. Intersubjective comparing (eü)

16a
3. This brings us to the third component in the emotive structure of ressentiment. All ressentiment feelings necessitate active or passive, intersubjective acts of "comparing" with others, in particular with those who have no ressentiment feelings. (Fs)

16b In this regard, an important factor concerning the phenomenology of intersubjective experience commonly referred to as the problem of the "I" and the "Thou," should be mentioned here. In phenomenological discussions this, the role of acts of comparing with others is rarely, if at all, seen in its significance. It appears that in pertinent literature authored by such thinkers as M. Buber, E. Husserl and E. Levinas among many others, little or no mention is made on the constitutive role of passive and active comparing with others. No matter if there is intersubjective ressentiment present, comparing lies at the very root of any intersubjective experience. Indeed, it can be held that without it, no co-experience of a person with another person can occur. (Fs)

16c Comparing is independent of whether my ego presupposes the presence of an alter-ego, a position held by Scheler since 1913, or whether an alter-ego presupposes an ego, something which E. Husserl suggested. (Fs)

16d Comparing with others is at the root of each alternative. It appears that the significance of comparing was first seen by I. Kant in his essay, "Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte," (The Probable Beginning of Human History). Kant states here that the first "stirrings" of reason consisted in making "comparisons" between objects given to the nutritive drive, on the one hand, with those given not in this drive, on the other, as visible but non-eatable objects. Comparing, says Kant, provoked enlargement of knowledge in that the first human beings were "renegades" from the spells of natural drives which drove them to "toy with the nature's voice." Comparing, Kant goes on to say, pushed the first humans to the "rim of an abyss" and into an eternity which, in turn, made them free. Both reason and freefom, therefore, are born together and in conjunction with the first act of comparing. (Fs)

17a Specifically, a person filled with ressentiment is provoked to compare his weakened value-feelings with those of persons having no ressentiment. This is the reason why the ressentiment-subject can at all elevate the values of his powerlessness. He even gets an aberrated satisfaction by emotively elevating negative values on a more praiseworthy level, but where they do not belong. He remains, as we indicated earlier, faced with the unattainability of those values that his ressentiment feeling keeps on tussling with in vain and which he detracts on a lower, less praiseworthy level. Ressentiment feelings just do not cease to be encapsuled in emotive comparing between "elevation" of inferior and negative values and the emotive failure to completely deprecate unattainable, positive values. (Fs)

17b Intersubjective comparing also bears heavily on the nature of society itself. A society beset with social discrepancies and competition is a most fertile ground for the psychic venom of ressentiment with its value-deceptions to leak into all walks of life. The opposite of this holds when individuals freely accept the social stations they are born in and where there is little or no competition. The pervasive slavery in ancient Rome, for example, apparently did not generate ressentiment to speak of against Roman masters. To be born a slave at the time was felt to be a natural state. Neither Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, nor Plato in his Republic perceive an omen of possible upheavals when they touch upon the theme of social classes. Accepting the social bed one was born in was, right or wrong, the order of the day, and contributed to some communal feelings of solidarity which modern societies are not prone to develop. (Fs) (notabene)

17c By contrast, any group which neither freely accepts different social levels nor individual persons of higher stations will -- as in a competitive society -- will be haunted by ressentiment. For this reason, the intensity of active comparing with others is especially obvious in the competition of contemporary society. Dishing out a myriad of awards -- a symbol of competition -- for whatever and sometimes even for insignificant so-called accomplishments, has turned into all but a cosmetic practice. The intensity of competition lets awards mushroom everywhere and for almost anything, sometimes for such oddities as the worst movie or ugliest grimace of the year. One can even apply for and buy awards. They are supposed to make an awardee comfortable; yet others, like ressentiment-subjects, to be sure, less comfortable. In many walks of life including business, awards are dished out with a tacit psychological motivation to spur others to emulate the "role models" showing their awards and thus to encourage more productivity, not necessarily for wage increments, and more of trolling for them. (Fs)

2. Kommentar (23.03.13), zu oben: Das erinnert mich sehr an Kolnais Verständnis von Hierarchie und Privileg.

18a Scheler gives a salient example for competitive feelings of resentment based in a psychic impotency, by mentioning a type of person he calls the "arrivist" (der Streber). The arrivist is a person who incessantly tries to "arrive" at the top, outdoing his fellow persons at any cost. This person-type comes close to certain "overachievers" today. He is unable to love, to give and forgive, to sacrifice, to admit defeat with his head up, to make friends, to be content with his own self. He is impotent to enjoy the value and quality of his life. He is good at smirking rather than smiling in friendship. Impervious and sometimes stiff as his personality is, his motivation to do overwork and crave for perfection is not motivated by realizing a common good like that of a corporation, a company, nation of church. Rather, his impotency to fill the deep gaps in his hollow personality generates the constant urge to do better than, and win over others in public and to fish for social esteem and respect. Marks for excellence acquired in school, business or elsewhere, cover up the personal dearth which makes him a social loner rather than a friends, sharing, and have compassion. (Fs)

19a In society material overachieverism plays also into applied ethics, so called, which tries to seek solutions for such moral dilemmas as abortion, racketeering, euthanasia, cruelty to animals, substitute motherhood, cloning genes and many more moral problems whose solution can not keep up from the fast pace of technology from which they in part originate. One avoids asking what this ethics is applied "from." And there is its impotency. Applied ethics like business, legal, or medical ethics, ethics for nursing, ethics for the police and "ethics committees" are indispensable for perceiving relevant states of affairs but appear to be impotent to encourage individual inspection into the moral tenor of the individual person. Instead, applied ethics favors to seek solutions for societal dilemmas by open debate alone. There is nothing wrong with this as long as a recourse to philosophical foundations of professional ethics is articulated, say, those provided by Aristotle, Kant or Mill. Applied ethics not infrequently presupposes that if one is able to turn society as a whole around for the better and to improve its political institutions and legal systems, the individual, too, will, in turn, also become good. But all careful investigations into the foundations of ethics have shown that the very opposite is the case: namely, that it is first the individual person's moral self-inspection, improvement of his actions, careful cultivation of self-responsibility and love for others will improve a society, its institutions and legal systems. It is easy to shift blame on anything but oneself, a point Scheler makes in order to indicate there may be blatant but hidden ressentiment. Likewise, it is easy for an arrivist to work for any goal but for that of his own moral standing. Whenever an individual is unable to face his self and instead loses himself and dissolves into external, societal relations to elude his self, there is an index of ressentiment possible. Scheler alluded to this in 1913 as "alienation" (Entfremdung). (Fs)

19b Having explained the three components of the structure of ressentiment (1) the emotive detraction or positive values, (2) the ranks among values, and (3) intersubjective comparing, there is no further need to analyze the various instances of ressentiment cases Scheler offers in his investigation. (Fs)

20a But two technical remarks may be added here instead, before reading the text. The first pertains to the initial forms of resentment Scheler mentions and which merge into ressentiment proper when the above given structure is at hand. These initial forms of ressentiment are: revenge, malice, envy, spite, "Scheelsucht" and "Schadenfreude." The two latter German words, ask for some explanation because there are no adequate English equivalents for them. (Fs)

20b German "Scheelsucht" refers to an uninterrupted blind impulse to detract. When people deride classical music, or rock, because they have no appreciation of either, there is not necessarily ressentiment involved but likes or dislikes. But when someone derides anything he comes across with, there is a blind value detraction present. There is neither a particular, nor a particular class of objects around this person which is not subject to his derision. He suffers from a plain, continued obsession to detract and to belittle the value of whatever, indeed that of the whole world. If, however, the latter is the case, such a person may be turn desperate and suicidal. In very intense cases of the kind a person may become suicidal. The word "Scheelsucht" is hardly used in German parlance. But its literal meaning fits well with what all that has been said. The more common adjective of the noun "Scheelsucht" is: "scheel," which means "cross-eyed." And "scheelsuechtig" means to have a very strong need to feel askance at others, to disparage. In our context, then, the word would figuratively translate into being "cross-valued" in the sense of the above mentioned inversion of value detraction and value elevation. (Fs)

Kommentar (24.03.13): Scheelsucht - scotosis

20c The word "Schadenfreude," on the other hand, is sometimes used in English, and refers to reveling in someone else's bad luck and misfortune. For example, the disappointed fans of a badly losing basketball team may suddenly revel over an unanticipated series of bad luck of their opposing team trying in vain till the end of the game to get the ball into the net, and losing the game after all. (Fs)

21a The second technical remark pertains to the German Collected Edition of Scheler's philosophy: the Gesammelte Werke. Presently, it comprises fourteen volumes, published from 1954 to 1965 by Francke Verlag, Bern, Switzerland; and from 1986 on by Bouvier Verlag, Bonn, Germany. From 1954 to 1969 Max Scheler's widow, Maria Scheler, was its editor, and from 1970 on, the present writer has borne undivided responsibility for the edition. (Fs)

21b An up to date list of English translations of Scheler's works is contained in: Max Scheler. On Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing. Edited with an Introduction by Harold J. Bershady. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London, 1992. (Fs)

Autor: Scheler, Max

Buch: Ressentiment

Titel: Ressentiment

Stichwort: Humanitarismus 1, Ressentiment; moderne Menschenliebe (humanitarian love): Unterschied in Objekt und Akt zu Liebe (im chr. Sinn); Bentham;

Kurzinhalt: It is characteristic that Christian terminology knows no "love of mankind." Its prime concept is "love of one's neighbor."... love descends step by step from its exalted place as token and symbol of an order which transcends the natural, indeed as the ...

Textausschnitt: IV Ressentiment and Modern Humanitarian Love

91a [79] Nietzsche ignored the fact that love in the Christian sense is always primarily directed at man's ideal spiritual self, at man as a member of the kingdom of God. Therefore he equated the Christian idea of love with a completely different idea which has quite another historical and psychological origin: the idea and movement of modern universal love of man, "humanitarianism," "love of mankind," or more plastically: "love toward every member of the human race." We agree with Nietzsche that ressentiment was the real root of this idea. (Fs)

91b If we ignore the verbal similarity of the terms "Christian love" and "universal love of mankind" and concentrate on their respective significance and spiritual atmosphere, we feel that they represent entirely different worlds. First of all, modern humanitarianism is in every respect a polemical and protesting concept. It protests against divine love, and consequently against the Christian unity and harmony of divine love, self-love, and love of one's neighbor which is the "highest commandment" of the Gospel. Love is not to be directed at the "divine" essence in man, but only at man as such, outwardly recognizable as a member of his species, at him who "is a member of the human race."1 This idea restricts love to the "human species," detaching it from all higher forces and values as well as from all other living beings and the rest of the world. "Man" is isolated not only from the "kingdom of God," but also from the non-human forms and forces of nature.2 At the same time, the community of angels and souls is replaced by "Mankind" as it exists at the moment -- mankind as a visible, limited, earthly natural being. The Christian community of souls also includes the dead, i.e., the whole of spiritually alive humanity, organized according to the aristocracy of its moral merits and personal values. Thus the real object of love extends into visible contemporary mankind insofar as divine spiritual life has germinated in it, but is much wider and greater and is always accessible in a living interchange of prayer, intercession, and veneration. "Love of mankind" is also polemical against (and devoid of piety toward) the love and veneration of the dead, the men of the past, and the tradition of their spiritual values and volitions in every form. Its object undergoes yet another change: the "neighbor" and the "individual," who alone represents humanity in its depth of personality, is replaced by "mankind" as a collective entity. All love for a part of mankind -- nation, family, individual -- now appears as an unjust deprivation of what we owe only to the totality. It is characteristic that Christian terminology knows no "love of mankind." Its prime concept is "love of one's neighbor." It is primarily directed at the person and at certain spiritually valuable acts -- and at "man" only to the degree that he is a "person" and accomplishes these acts, i.e., to the degree to which he realizes the order of the "kingdom of God." It is directed at the "neighbors," the "nearest" visible beings who are alone capable of that deeper penetration into the layer of spiritual personality which is the highest form of love. Modern humanitarian love, on the other hand, is only interested in the sum total of human individuals. Bentham's principle that each individual should count for one, and none for more than one, is only a conscious formulation of the implicit tendency of modern "humanitarianism." Therefore all love for a more restricted circle here appears a priori as a deprivation of the rights due to the wider circle -- without any reference to such questions as value and "nearness to God." Thus patriotism is supposed to deprive "mankind," etc.3 (Fs) (notabene)

93a [80] The difference between Christian love and modern humanitarianism lies not only in their objects, but also in the subjective side of the process of loving. Christian love is essentially a spiritual action and movement, as independent of our body and senses as the acts and laws of thinking. Humanitarian love is a feeling, and a passive one, which arises primarily by means of psychical contagion when we perceive the outward expression of pain and joy. We suffer when we see pain and rejoice when we see pleasant sensations. In other words, we do not even suffer in sympathy with the other person's suffering as such, but only with our sense perception of his pain. It is no coincidence that the philosophical and psychological theoreticians of the 17th and 18th centuries, who gradually elaborated the theoretical formulation of the new ethos, define the essence of love with reference to the phenomena of sympathy, compassion, and shared joy, which in turn they reduce to psychical contagion.4 This goes particularly for the great English thinkers from Hutcheson, Adam Smith, David Hume to Bain, and also for Rousseau.5 The pathos of modern humanitarianism, its clamor for greater sensuous happiness, its subterraneously smoldering passion, its revolutionary protest against all institutions, traditions, and customs which it considers as obstacles to the increase of sensuous happiness, its whole revolutionary spirit -- all this is in characteristic contrast to the luminous, almost cool spiritual enthusiasm of Christian love. It should not surprise us that psychological theory, following this historical change in experiencing love, increasingly dissolves the very phenomenon of love into a mechanism of necessary delusions. Sometimes sympathy is reduced to the act of artificially putting oneself in another's place -- according to the question: "What would you feel if this happened to you?" -- and of reproducing the feelings we ourselves experienced at analogous occasions. Sometimes (as by Bain) it is reduced to a kind of hallucination of feeling, in which we are violently drawn into the other person's state of mind, as if we momentarily underwent the sufferings we see. Then again, it is explained as an "empathy" through the reproduction of one's own previous experiences; this reproduction is supposed to be directly prompted by the imitation of the other person's expressions of emotion, so that we need not "put ourselves in his place."6 Finally, sympathy may be interpreted as the mere mental correlative of certain fixed and primary impulses to act which are useful for the species -- i.e., as a consequence of the gregarious instinct, which can be observed even in the animal kingdom.7 Thus in theory as well, love descends step by step from its exalted place as token and symbol of an order which transcends the natural, indeed as the moving force within the kingdom of God. It becomes an animal drive which continually grows in refinement and complexity through man's social evolution and intellectual development. Starting from the sexual sphere, it becomes ever more richly specialized and tends to spread over wider and wider areas. Spencer and Darwin were the thinkers who finally formulated this reduction of love's loftiest expressions to the instinct of furthering the species, existing already in animal societies. The reduction presupposes a complete misunderstanding of the nature of these phenomena, and it was possible only after the historical movement itself had evolved certain feelings -- and a concomitant idea -- whose psychological core may indeed not be essentially different from the mentality of gregarious animals.8 (Fs)

Autor: Scheler, Max

Buch: Ressentiment

Titel: Ressentiment

Stichwort: Humanitarismus 2; Ressentiment; Sinn der Menschenliebe: nicht Sorge um Heil, sondern Förderung des Gemeinwohls

Kurzinhalt: The value of love is not supposed to lie in the salvation of the lover's soul as a member of the kingdom of God, and in the ensuing contribution to the salvation of others, but in the advancement of "general welfare."

Textausschnitt: 94a [82] Finally, the valuation of "universal love of mankind" has a foundation which widely differs from that of love in Christian morality. The value of love is not supposed to lie in the salvation of the lover's soul as a member of the kingdom of God, and in the ensuing contribution to the salvation of others, but in the advancement of "general welfare." Love is merely the X in emotional life which leads to generally useful acts, or the "disposition" for such emotions. It has positive value only insofar as it has this possible value of effectiveness. The best world, in the Christian perspective, would be the world with a maximum of love, even if that love were unaccompanied by insight in the state of mind of others (i.e., the ability to "understand" others) and in the natural and social causal relations which are indispensable if love is to effect useful rather than detrimental actions. In the modern perspective, humanitarian love itself is only one of the causal factors which can augment the general welfare. But what if we object that other feelings and instincts -- such as the instinct of self-preservation, the sexual urge, jealousy, lust for power, vanity - advance "welfare" and its development much more than love?1 The defender of modern humanitarianism can only answer that the value of love is not exclusively determined by the insignificant amount of usefulness it creates -- after all, narcotics, the antiseptic dressing of wounds, and similar inventions have allayed much more pain and dried many more tears than love! Love is also valuable because it is so much rarer than these other instincts. It needs augmenting -- an aim which is furthered in turn by its social prestige. If the "altruistic" urges (which supposedly coincide with "love") should ever happen to prevail quantitatively over the egoistic inclinations, then the latter would be more highly esteemed. It hardly needs stating that this "theory" is in complete contradiction with the evident meaning of our valuation of love. (Fs) (notabene)

95a [83] The profound inner difference between the facts and concepts of Christian and those of humanitarian love seems to have escaped Nietzsche completely. He failed to realize that everywhere many demands made in the name of humanitarian love were different from the spirit of Christian love and often diametrically opposed to it. The highly Christian period of the Middle Ages, during which Christian love reached its purest flowering as an idea and form of life, saw no contradiction between this principle and the feudal aristocratic hierarchy of secular and ecclesiastical society, including bondage. It was able to accept such phenomena as the contemplative life of the monks, which was hardly "generally useful"2; the numerous formations of territorial states and rules, the countless local customs; the rigorous discipline in education; war, knighthood, and the system of values based on them; the qualified death penalty, torture, and the whole cruel penal code; even the Inquisition and the autodafés. In fact, the judgments of the Inquisition were decreed "in the name of love" -- not merely love for the community of true believers who might be poisoned by the heretic and deprived of their salvation, but love for the heretic himself. Through the burning of his body, his soul was to be specially commended to God's grace. This intentionality of love was entirely sincere, though from our point of view it is based on superstition. Thus all these facts were quite compatible with the principle of Christian love,3 and some of them were actually justified in its name, as means to educate men to Christian love (though in part, of course, with superstitious premises). Yet in the name of the universal love of mankind they are rejected, fought, and overthrown. Humanitarian love is from the outset an egalitarian force which demands the dissolution of the feudal and aristocratic hierarchy, of all forms of bondage and personal subjection, and the abolition of the "idle" and useless monastic orders. For Bossuet it was still evident that patriotism is preferable to love of mankind, since the values invested in one's native country are of an essentially higher order than those which all men hold in common. Now it appears evident that the value of love grows with its range. Here too, the quantitative criterion replaces the qualitative one. "Universal love of mankind" becomes progressively more powerful until the French Revolution, when one head after another was struck off "in the name of mankind." It demands the removal of national and territorial "blinkers," the political and finally even the socio-economic equality of all men, the standardization of life in customs and usages, and a more "humane" and uniform system of education. It increasingly calls for universal peace and bitterly fights all those forms of life and value judgments which spring from knighthood and indeed from the whole caste of warriors. The alleviation of the penal code, the abolition of torture and of the qualified death penalty are demanded in its name. To its representatives, the Inquisition is nothing but insult and mockery, directed against the very essence of the commandment of love -- not an institution based on superstition. The attitude toward the poor, the sick, and the morally evil undergoes a fundamental change as well. Modern humanitarianism does not command and value the personal act of love from man to man, but primarily the impersonal "institution" of welfare. This is not the exuberance of a life that bestows blissfully and lovingly, overflowing out of its abundance and inner security. It is an involvement, through psychical contagion, in the feeling of depression that is manifested in outward expressions of pain and poverty. The purpose of the helping deed is to remove this specifically modern phenomenon of "sham pity," of "feeling sorry."4 Christian "Mercy" (note the force and spirit of this old-fashioned word) is replaced by the feeling expressed in the statement "it arouses my pity"!5 As early as 1787, Goethe could question the kind of "humanism" (Humanität) Herder preached under Rousseau's influence: "Moreover ... I think it is true that humanism will triumph at last; only I fear that the world will at the same time be a vast hospital, where each will be his fellow man's humane sick-nurse."6 The movement of modern humanitarianism found its first powerful literary expression in Rousseau - often, indeed, concealed in this great mind's rich and multifarious preoccupations, but quite evidently propelled by the fire of a gigantic ressentiment. His ideas are presented so suggestively that scarcely one great German of that time, except for Goethe, escaped the contagious power of Rousseau's pathos (for example, Fichte, Herder, Schiller, Kant all have their Rousseauistic phase). Humanitarianism found its philosophical expression and clear formulation chiefly in the positivistic circles, starting with Auguste Comte, who puts "mankind" as "Grand-Etre" in the place of God.7 Its most repugnant manifestations -- which in reality only develop the original germs of the idea -- are the modern realist "social" novel, the dramatical and lyrical poetry of sickness and morbidity, and the modern "social" administration of justice. (Fs)

Autor: Scheler, Max

Buch: Abhandlungen und Aufsätze

Titel: Abhandlungen und Aufsätze

Stichwort: Moderne Menschenliebe 1; Ressentiment; Protest gegen Gottesliebe; Liebe als Wohlfahrt; Träger des Menschenangesichts

Kurzinhalt: Die moderne Menschenliebe ... protestiert gegen die Gottesliebe ... Nicht auf das »Göttliche« im Menschen, sondern auf den Menschen bloß als »Menschen«, sofern er äußerlich als Glied dieser Gattung kenntlich ist, auf den »Träger des Menschenangesichts« ,

Textausschnitt: IV. RESSENTIMENT UND MODERNE MENSCHENLIEBE

169a Die Nichtbeachtung der Tatsache, daß Liebe im christlichen Sinne immer nur auf das ideale geistige Selbst im Menschen und seine Mitgliedschaft im Gottesreich bezogen ist, brachte es auch mit sich, daß Nietzsche die christliche Liebesidee mit einer völlig verschiedenen, auf einem ganz anderen historischen und psychologischen Boden gewachsenen Idee gleichsetzen konnte, die auf Wertschätzungen beruht, von denen auch wir mit Nietzsche gnnehmen, daß Ressentiment ihre eigentliche Wurzel gewesen ist: Das ist die Idee und die Bewegung der modernen allgemeinen Menschenliebe, oder auch »Liebe zur Menschheit«, oder plastischer ausgedrückt, die »Liebe zu allem, was Menschenengesicht trägt«. Hält man sich nicht an den Gleichkleng der Wörter, sondern an ihre Bedeutung und geistige Atmosphäre, so wird man sofort die Luft einer ganz anderen Welt atmen, wenn man von »christlicher Liebe« zur »allgemeinen Menschenliebe« übergeht. Die moderne Menschenliebe ist zunächst nach allen Richtungen ein polemischer und protestlerischer Begriff. Sie protestiert gegen die Gottesliebe, und damit auch gegen jene christliche Einheit und Harmonie von Gottes-, Selbst- und Nächstenliebe, welche das Evangelium ausspricht. Nicht auf das »Göttliche« im Menschen, sondern auf den Menschen bloß als »Menschen«, sofern er äußerlich als Glied dieser Gattung kenntlich ist, auf den »Träger des Menschenangesichts« soll sich die Liebe richten1). Und wie diese Idee die Liebe nach »oben« hin partikularisiert auf die von allen höheren Kräften und Werten abgelöste »Menschengattung«, so auch nach »unten« hin gegen die übrigen belebten Wesen, ja die übrige Welt. Wie in ihr der »Mensch« losgelöst erscheint vom »Gottesreich«, so auch losgelöst von den Gebilden und Kräften der übrigen Natur2). Gleichzeitig tritt an die Stelle der Gesamtheit der Seelen, die nach christlicher Anschauuns: auch die Verstorbenen umfaßt, d. h. die gesamte geistig [170] lebendige Menschheit, geordnet nach der Aristokratie ihrer sittlhlichen Personwerte und Verdienste — so also, daß das eigentliche Objekt der Liebe in die sichtbare gegenwärtige Menschheit wohl hineinreicht, soweit göttlich geistiges Leben in ihr aufgegangen ist, aber doch weit umfassender und größer ist als diese — und immer zugänglich in der lebendigen Wechselwirkung von Gebet, Fürbitte, Verehrung — die »Menschheit« als nur gegenwärtiges, sichtbares, begrenztes, irdisches Naturwesen. So wird die »Menschenliebe« auch polemisch und pietätlos gegen die Liebe und Verehrung der Toten, der vergangenen Menschen und gegen die Tradition ihrer geistigen Werte und Willensäußerungen in jeder Form. Und auch darin ändert sich ihr Objekt, daß nun an die Stelle des »Nächsten« und des »Individuums«, in dem sich die personhafte Tiefe des Menschseins allein »darstellt«, »die Menschheit« als Kollektivum tritt und jede Art von Liebe zu einem Teil ihrer, Volk, Familie, Individuum wie eine widerrechtliche Entziehung dessen erscheint, was man nur dem Ganzen als Ganzem schuldet. Eine »Liebe zur Menschheit« kennt die christliche Sprache, charakteristisch genug, nicht! Ihr Grundbegriff heißt »Nächstenliebe«. Dagegen ist die moderne Menschenliebe weder zunächst auf die Person und auf bestimmte Werte geistiger Aktbetätigung gerichtet (und auf den »Menschen« nur soweit, als er »Person« [171] ist und jene Akte durch ihn vollzogen werden, als sich durch ihn also die Gesetzmäßigkeit des »Gottesreiches« vollzieht), noch auf die »nächsten« anschaulichen Wesen, die allein jenes tieferen Eindringens in jene Schicht des geistig Persönlichseins fähig sind, in deren Erfassung die höchste Form der Liebe besteht, — sondern auf die Summe der menschlichen Individuen als Summe. Das Prinzip Benthams: »Jeder gelte für einen und keiner für mehr als einen« ist nur eine bewußte Formulierung der in der Bewegung der modernen »Menschenliebe« von Hause aus liegenden Richtung. Darum erscheint hier jede Liebe zum kleineren Kreise a priori — ohne daß nach den in ihm investierten Werten, ohne daß nach seiner »Gottesnähe« gefragt ist — als eine Entrechtung des größeren Kreises; Vaterlandsliebe z. B. als Entrechtung der »Menschheit« usw3). (Fs)

171a [93a] Wie der Gegenstand der Liebe, ist aber auch die subjektive Seite des Vorgangs in der modernen Menschenliebe ganz verschieden von dem, was in der christlichen Sprache »Liebe« heißt. Die neue Menschenliebe ist nicht zuvörderst Akt und Bewegung, und zwar geistiger Art — nicht minder wesensunabhängig von unserer sinnlich — leiblichen Konstitution wie die Akte des Denkens und ihre Gesetzmäßigkeit — , sondern sie ist Gefühl, und zwar zuständliches Gefühl, wie es in erster Linie an der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung des äußeren Ausdrucks von Schmerz und Freude durch die Übertragungsform der psychischen Ansteckung erwächst. Leiden an den sinnenfälligen Schmerzen und Freude an den sinnenfälligen angenehmen Empfindungen ist der Kern dieser neuen Menschenliebe — nicht einmal Mitleiden mit ihrem Gelittenwerden. Es ist daher kein Zufall, daß die philosophischen und psychologischen Theoretiker des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts, die das neue Ethos allmählich theoretisch formulierten, das Wesen der Liebe aus den Erscheinungen der Sympathie, des Mitleids, und der Mitfreude verstehen wollen, diese selbst aber aus dem Phänomen der psychischen Ansteckung4). So insonderheit die großen Engländer von Hutcheson, Adam Smith, D. Hume bis zu Bain. So auch Rosseau5). Das Pathos der modernen Menschenliebe, ihr Aufschrei nach einer sinnlich glückseligeren Menschheit, ihre unterirdisch glühende Leidenschaft, ihre revolutionäre Entrüstung gegen alles, was sie für die Steigerung der sinnlichen Glückseligkeit als Hemmung ansieht an Institution, Tradition, Sitte, das »revolutionäre Herz«, das in ihr pulsiert, steht in einem charakteristischen Gegensatz zu dem hellen und fast kühlen geistigen Enthusiasmus der christlichen Liebe. Es darf uns nicht wundern, daß nun auch die Theorie — dieser historischen Erlebniswendung Gefolgschaft leistend — das Phänomen der Liebe überhaupt — in steigendem Maße — in eine Mechanik notwendiger Täuschungen auflöst. Das Mitgefühl wird entweder auf eine künstliche Hineinversetzung in den fremden Seelenzustand gemäß der Frage: »was würdest du fühlen, wenn es dir so erginge?« und eine Reproduktion eigener Gefühlszustände, die wir bei analogen Anlässen erlebten, zurückgeführt; oder auf ein Hineingerissensein in den fremden Gefühlszustand, eine Art Gefühlshalluzination (Bain) - als litten wir momentan selbst, was wir leiden sehen; oder auf eine »Einfühlung« eigener reproduzierter Gefühlserlebnisse, die durch Nachahmung des fremden Gefühlsausdrucks unmittelbar — ohne besondere »Hineinversetzung« — angeregt werden6); oder schließlich nur auf eine seelische [174] Begleiterscheinung primär entstandener und fixierter gattungsnützlicher Handlungsimpulse, d. h. als Folgeerscheinung des schon im Tierreich wahrnehmbaren Herdentriebs zurückgeführt7). So sinkt Schritt für Schritt auch in der Theorie die Liebe herab von der Höhe, Symbol und Zeichen einer übernatürlichen Ordnung, ja der dem Gottesreiche inwendige Kraftstrom zu sein, zu einer feineren und vermöge der intellektuellen Entwicklung immer verwickeiteren Ausbildung eines tierischen Triebimpulses, der von der sexuellen Sphäre seinen Ursprung nehmend sich immer reicher gegenständlich spezialisiert und immer größere und größere Kreise durch die steigende Ausbildung des Verstandeslebens und der sozialen Entwicklung zu umfassen tendiert. Eine solche Zurückführung der höchsten Erscheinungen der Liebe auf die, in tierischen Gesellschaften schon angelegten Triebe eines gattungsfördernden Handelns ~ wie sie dann schließlich Darwin und H. Spencer unternahmen — , war erst möglich, nachdem das Wesen dieser Erscheinungen völlig verkannt war; und nachdem sich in der historischen Bewegung selbst Gefühle emporgearbeitet hatten, — und eine ihnen entsprechende Idee, — in denen vielleicht in der Tat nicht so wesentlich verschiedene seelische Tatbestände von [175] denen den Kernbestand bilden, die wir bei herdenmäßig lebenden Tieren anzunehmen Grund haben8). (Fs)

Autor: Scheler, Max

Buch: Abhandlungen und Aufsätze

Titel: Abhandlungen und Aufsätze

Stichwort: Moderne Menschenliebe 2; Ressentiment; nicht Sorge um Heil, sondern Förderung des Gemeinwohls

Kurzinhalt: Nicht in der Gewinnung des Heils der Seele des Liebenden als Glied des Gottesreichs und der in ihr erwirkten Förderung des fremden Heiles, sondern in der Förderung des sog. »Gesamtwohls« bestünde hiernach der Wert der Liebe.

Textausschnitt: 176a Endlich [94a] ist aber auch die Wertschätzung, die der »allgemeinen Menschenliebe« zuteil wird, eine ganz anders fundierte, als diejenige ist, die innerhalb der christlichen Moral die Liebe findet. Nicht in der Gewinnung des Heils der Seele des Liebenden als Glied des Gottesreichs und der in ihr erwirkten Förderung des fremden Heiles, sondern in der Förderung des sog. »Gesamtwohls« bestünde hiernach der Wert der Liebe. Die Liebe erscheint hier nur als das X im Gefühlsleben, das zu gemeinnützigen Handlungen führt, bzw. als die »Disposition« zu solchen Gefühlen. Nur sofern sie diesen möglichen Wirkungswert hat, wird ihr selbst ein positiver Wert beigemessen. Und während nach christlicher Anschauung eine Welt die beste wäre, in der möglichst viel Liebe ist — selbst wenn die zu gemeinnützigen Handlungen, die Liebe bewirken kann, ja ebenso notwendige Einsicht in die fremden Gemütszustände, d. h. die Fähigkeit des »Verstehens« anderer Menschen und die nicht minder notwendige Einsicht in die natürlichen und sozialen Kausalverhältnisse fehlen würde und durch diesen Mangel gemeinschädliche Handlungen bestimmt würden [176] — gilt hier die Menschenliebe selbst nur als einer der kausalen Faktoren, die das allgemeine Wohl zu vergrößern vermögen. Gegenüber der Tatsache aber, daß andere Gefühle und Triebe, wie Selbsterhaltungstrieb, Geschlechtstrieb, Eifersucht, Herrschsucht, Eitelkeit vom kausalen Standpunkt die »Wohlfahrt« und ihre Entwicklung noch weit mehr wie Liebe fördern1), muß der Vertreter der modernen Menschenliebe antworten, daß sich die Wertschätzung der Liebe nicht nur nach dem Maße des allerdings verschwindenden Nutzens, den sie schafft — Narkotika und Listerverband haben doch weit mehr »Schmerzen gestillt und Tränen getrocknet« als Liebe! — bemißt, sondern auch danach, daß sie gegenüber der Verbreitung jener Triebe eine so seltene Sache ist, daß sie einer Vermehrung bedarf, die wiederum durch die Prämie, die das soziale Werturteil darauf setzt, erzielt werde. Würden die »altruistischen« Regungen, die ja hier mit »Liebe« zusammenfallen sollen, einmal zufällig das quantitative Übergewicht über die egoistischen erhalten, so würden auch die letzteren die höhere Schätzung finden. Daß diese »Theorie« aber dem evidenten Sinne unserer Wertschätzung der Liebe völlig widerspricht, bedarf keiner Ausführung. (Fs)

178a Aus dieser tiefsten und innersten Verschiedenheit der Tatsachen und Begriffe der christlichen Liebe und der allgemeinen Menschenliebe läßt es sich — was Nietzsche ganz entgangen zu sein scheint — nun auch verstehen, daß im Namen der modernen Menschenliebe toto coelo verschiedene Forderungen ergangen sind als im Namen der christlichen Liebe; ja häufig sogar diametral entgegengesetzte Forderungen. Die hochchristlichen Zeiten des Mittelalters, in denen die christliche Liebe als Lebensform und Idee die reinsten Blüten trieb, empfanden keinen Gegensatz dieses Prinzips zu der feudalen und aristokratischen Standesordnung der staatlichen und kirchlichen Gesellschaft, zu Hörigkeit; keinen Gegensatz zu dem wenig »gemeinnützigen«, contemplativen Leben der Mönche2), zu den vielen Bildungen der Territorialstaaten und Herrschaften, der Fülle der heimatlich gebundenen Sitten; zu der scharfen Zucht in [178] den Formen der Erziehung; zu kriegerischem und ritterlichem Wesen und Wertschätzungen; keinen Gegensatz zu qualifizierter Todesstrafe und Folter und dem sonstigen harten Strafkodex; ja nicht einmal zu Inquisition und Autodafé! Wurden doch die Urteile der Inquisition sogar »im Namen der Liebe« verhängt, nicht nur mit der Intention der Liebe auf die gläubige Gesamtheit, die durch den Ketzer vergiftet und um ihr Heil betrogen würde, sondern mit der ganz ehrlichen — wenn auch von unserem Standpunkte in Aberglauben gegründeten — Intention der Liebe auf den Ketzer selbst, dessen Seele durch seine leibliche Verbrennung gerade im besonderen Maße der göttlichen Gnade empfohlen werden sollte. Alle diese Tatsachen, die sich mit dem christlichen Liebesprinzip wohl vertrugen3), ja zum Teil sich als Erziehungsmittel zur christlichen Liebe aus ihm — freilich zum Teil nur unter abergläubischen Voraussetzungen — rechtfertigen ließen, werden im Namen der allgemeinen Menschenliebe zurückgewiesen, bekämpft und umgeworfen. Von vornherein eine demokratisierende Kraft, wird in ihrem Namen die Auflösung der feudalen und aristokratischen Ordnung der Gesellschaft, aller Formen der Hörigkeit und persönlichen Unfreiheit, die Abschaffung der »faulen«, sich dem gemein [179] nützigen Leben entziehenden Mönchsorden gefordert. Während es noch für Bossuet selbstverständHch war, daß die Liebe zum Vaterland den Vorzug vor der Liebe zur Menschheit verdiene, da die im Vaterland investierte Wertfülle Werte von wesenhaft höherem Rang enthalte, als es die Werte sind, die alle Menschen noch gemeinsam ihr eigen nennen können, wird es nun selbstverständlich, daß die Liebe um so wertvoller sei, je größer der Kreis ist, auf den sie sich bezieht; auch hier verdrängt der quantitative Maßstab den qualitativen: und demgemäß heischt die »allgemeine Menschenliebe« immer mächtiger bis zur französischen Revolution, wo im »Namen der Menschheit« Kopf für Kopf heruntergeschlagen wurde, die Ablegung der nationalen und territorialen »Scheuklappen«, die staatsbürgerliche und schließlich auch ökonomisch-soziale Gleichheit der Menschen; die Uniformierung des Lebens in Sitte und Brauch, die »humanere« und gleichartigere Form der Erziehung. In ihrem Namen ergeht steigend die Forderung eines allgemeinen Weltfriedens und ein erbitterter Kampf gegen alle Lebensformen und Werturteile, die aus dem ritterlichen Leben, ja aus der Kriegerkaste überhaupt stammen. In ihrem Namen wird die Milderung der Strafjustiz, Abschaffung der Folter und der qualifizierten Todes- strafe verlangt, und in der Inquisition können ihre Vertreter — anstatt eine auf Aberglaube fundierte Einrichtung — nur Spott und Hohn auf das Liebesgebot überhaupt erblicken. Auch das Verhalten zu den Armen, Kranken, sittlich Schlechten wird aus der modernen Menschenliebe oder Humanität heraus ein innerlich grundverschiedenes. Es ist nicht die persönliche Liebestat von Mensch zu Mensch, sondern an erster Stelle die unpersönliche »Einrichtung«, die Wohlfahrtseinrichtung, die gefordert und gewertet wird. Und es ist nicht das überquellende Leben, das selig aus seiner Fülle, seinem Überfluß heraus — seiner inneren Gewappnetheit und Sicherheit heraus liebend dahingibt, sondern die in der Anschauung der äußeren Ausdruckserscheinungen von Schmerz und Armut sich ergebende Hineinziehung und Ansteckung durch das in diesen Erscheinungen sich darstellende Depressionsgefühl, das spezifisch moderne »Scheinmitleid« und »Dauern«, das durch die helfende Tat aufgehoben werden soll4). An Stelle der christlichen »Barmherzigkeit« (man fühle die Kraft und den Atem dieses unmodernen Wortes) tritt das »Es dauert mich!«5) Goethe konnte schon 1787 sein Fragezeichen machen zu jener Art, von Herder unter Rousseaus Einfluß gepredigten »Humanität«: »Auch halte ich es für wahr, daß die Humanität endlich siegen wird. Nur fürchte ich, daß zu gleicher Zeit die Welt ein großes Hospital und einer des Anderen humaner Krankenwärter sein werde«. Ihren literarischen Ausdruck gewann dann die Bewegung der modernen Menschenliebe zuerst in gewaltigster Form in Rousseau, in den reichen und mannigfaltigen Bindungen dieses großen Geistes freilich oft versteckt, aber doch offensichtlich genug durch das Feuer eines riesenhaften Ressentiment getrieben, aber so suggestiv dargestellt, daß außer Goethe kaum ein großer Deutscher jener Zeit der Ansteckung durch Rousseaus Pathos entging (Fichte, Herder, Schiller, Kant z. B, haben alle ihre Rousseauphase); ihren philosophischen Ausdruck und ihre Formulierung gewann sie vor allem in den positivistischen Kreisen, von A. Comte angefangen, der »die Menschheit« als »Grand-Etre« an die Stelle [182] Gottes setzt. Ihren widerwärtigsten Ausdruck endlich, der freilich nur enthüllt, was an Keimen von Anfang an in der Idee lag, im modernen realistischen »sozialen« Roman und in der dramatischen und lyrischen Hospital- und Lazarettpoesie, sowie der modernen »sozialen« Rechtsprechung. (Fs)

Autor: Scheler, Max

Buch: Ressentiment

Titel: Ressentiment

Stichwort: Humanitarismus 3; Menschenliebe als Protest gegen Minderheiten mit Werten u. Hass auf Gott (nicht als Bestätigung eines positiven Wertes); Scheinform d. Gotteshasses;

Kurzinhalt: The humanitarian movement is in its essence a ressentiment phenomenon, as appears from the very fact that this socio-historical emotion is by no means based on a spontaneous and original affirmation of a positive value, but on a protest, a counter-impulse

Textausschnitt: 98a [85] Friedrich Nietzsche lived in a period when precisely these extreme formulations and products of "Modern humanitarianism" were gaining consideration and applause. This explains his struggle against the whole movement. (Fs)

98b For in our opinion he is right in interpreting this idea, and especially the way in which it developed in the modern social movement -- but not the Christian idea of love! -- as a historical accumulation of ressentiment, growing through tradition. He rightly sees in it a symptom and expression of descending life. The humanitarian movement is in its essence a ressentiment phenomenon, as appears from the very fact that this socio-historical emotion is by no means based on a spontaneous and original affirmation of a positive value, but on a protest, a counter-impulse (hatred, envy, revenge, etc.) against ruling minorities that are known to be in the possession of positive values. "Mankind" is not the immediate object of love (it cannot be, for love can be aroused only by concrete objects) -- it is merely a trump card against a hated thing. Above all, this love of mankind is the expression of a repressed rejection, of a counter-impulse against God.1 It is the disguised form of a repressed hatred of God. Again and again it proclaims that there is "not enough love in the world" for wasting it on non-human beings -- a typical ressentiment statement. Bitterness against the idea of the highest lord, inability to bear the "all-seeing eye," impulses of revolt against "God" as the symbolic unity and concentration of all positive values and their rightful domination -- all these are primary components of humanitarian love. "Lovingly" stooping to man as a natural being -- that is the second step! Man is loved because his pain, his ills and sufferings in themselves form a gladly accepted objection against God's wise and benevolent rule." Wherever I find historical evidence of this feeling, I also detect a secret satisfaction that the divine rule can be impugned.2 Since the positive values are anchored in the idea of God through the power of tradition -- a tradition even non-believers cannot escape -- it inevitably follows that this "humanitarian love," based as it is on protest and rejection, becomes primarily directed at the lowest, the animal aspects of human nature. These, after all, are the qualities which "all" men dearly have in common. This tendency is still unmistakable in the terms we use to point out a person's "humanity." We rarely do this when he has done something good and reasonable, or something which distinguishes him -- usually we want to defend him against a reproach or an accusation: "He is only human," "We are all human," "To err is human," etc. This emotional tendency is typical for modern humanitarianism. A man who is nothing and has nothing is still a "human being." The very fact that love is directed at the species implies that it is essentially concerned with the inferior qualities which must be "understood" and "excused." Who can fail to detect the secretly glimmering hatred against the positive higher values, which are not essentially tied to the "species" -- a hatred hidden deep down below this "mild," "understanding," "humane" attitude? (Fs) (notabene)

Autor: Scheler, Max

Buch: Abhandlungen und Aufsätze

Titel: Abhandlungen und Aufsätze

Stichwort: Moderne Menschenliebe 2; Ressentiment; Protest gegen Minderheiten mit Werten; Hass auf Gott; Scheinform d. Gotteshasses

Kurzinhalt: Überall wo ich Zeugnisse dieses Gefühls historisch antreffe, finde ich jene geheime Lust, Anklage erheben zu können gegen die göttliche Regierung ...

Textausschnitt: 183a [98a] Fr. Nietzsche lebte in einer Zeit, da gerade diese derbsten Formulierungen und Ausgeburten der »modernen allgemeinen Menschenliebe« Ansehen und Beifall fanden. Und man versteht hieraus seinen Kampf gegen diese Bewegung! (Fs)

183b Denn darin hat er unsers Erachtens recht, wenn er diese Idee besonders in der Richtung, in der sie sich in der modernen sozialen Bewegung entfaltet hat, — nicht aber die christliche Liebesidee — auf historisch cumuliertes und durch Tradition wachsendes Ressentiment zurückführt und ein Anzeichen und einen Ausdruck niedergehenden Lebens in ihr erblickt. Der Kern in der Bewegung der modernen allgemeinen Menschenliebe ist schon dadurch als auf Ressentiment beruhend erkennbar, daß diese sozial-historische Gemütsbewegung durchaus nicht auf einer ursprünglichen, spontanen Hinbewegung zu einem positiven Werte beruht, sondern auf einem Protest, einem Gegenimpuls (Haß, Neid, Rachsucht usw.) gegen herrschende Minoritäten, die man im Besitze positiver Werte weiß. Die »Menschheit« ist nicht das unmittelbare [183] Objekt der Liebe in ihr (schon da nur Anschauliches die Liebe bewegen kann), sondern sie wird in ihr bloß ausgespielt gegen ein Gehaßtes. An erster Stelle ist diese Menschenliebe die Ausdrucksform einer verdrängten Ablehnung, eines Gegenimpulses gegen Gott1). Sie ist die Schein- form eines verdrängten Gotteshasses! Immer wieder führt sie sich mit der Wendung ein, es sei doch »nicht genug Liebe in der Welt«, als daß man einen Teil noch an außermenschliche Wesen abgeben könnte — eine echte von Ressentiment diktierte Wendung! Gefühle der Erbitterung gegen die Idee des höchsten Herrn und jenes Nichtertragenkönnen des »allsichtigen Auges«, Aufstandsimpulse gegen »Gott« auch als der symbolischen Einheit und Zusammenfassung aller positiven Werte und ihrer berechtigten Herrschaft ist in ihr das erste; die »liebevolle« Herabbeugung zum Menschen als Naturwesen, als dem Wesen, das durch seinen Schmerz, durch sein Übel und Leid an sich schon einen freudig ergriffenen Einwand gegen Gottes »weise und gütige Regierung« bildet — das zweite! Überall wo ich Zeugnisse dieses Gefühls historisch antreffe, finde ich jene geheime Lust, Anklage erheben zu können gegen die göttliche Regierung2). [184] Da die positivsten Werte schon durch die Macht der Tradition — auch in den Ungläubigen — in der Idee Gottes verankert sind, so ist es auch verständlich und notwendig, daß der Blick und das Interesse dieser auf Protest und Ablehnung begründeten »Menschenliebe« zuvörderst auf die niedrigsten und tierischen Seiten der Menschennatur — und diese sind es ja zunächst, die »alle« Menschen gemein haben — fällt. Diese Tendenz gewahren wir deutlich in den Gelegenheiten, bei denen noch heute auf das »Menschsein« eines Individuums wörtlich hingewiesen wird. Das geschieht jedenfalls viel seltener, wenn jemand etwas Gutes und Vernünftiges getan hat oder etwas, was ihn vor anderen im positiven Sinne aus zeichnet, als in solchen Fällen, da man ihn entschuldigen will gegen einen Vorwurf oder eine Anklage: »Er ist eben auch ein Mensch«, »Menschen sind wir alle«! »Irren ist menschlich« usw. Wer sonst nichts ist und hat, ist in der Gefühlstendenz dieser für die moderne Menschenliebe charakteristischen Wendungen immer noch »ein Mensch«. Schon diese Richtung der Menschenliebe auf das Gattungsmäßige [185] macht sie zugleich wesentUch auf das Niedrige gerichtet, auf das, was »verstanden« und »entschuldigt« werden muß. Wer sähe aber darin nicht den im geheimen glimmenden Haß gegen die positiven höheren Werte, die eben wesenhaft nicht an das »Gattungsmäßige« gebunden sind, und der sich unter dieser »milden«, »verstehenden«, »menschlichen« Haltung in der Tiefe verbirgt? (Fs)