Autor: Plato

Buch: Gorgias

Titel: Gorgias

Stichwort: Position - Gegenposition: weltliche - innere Werte; Freiheit (Gorgias - Sokrates)

Kurzinhalt: two contrasting positions: firm adherence to outer, worldly goals and values, and firm adherence to inner goals and values

Textausschnitt: XIVb In Gorgias, then, Plato faces us with two or three extreme points of view. A major part of the brilliance and fame of the dialogue is due to its vivid (and sometimes amusing) exposition of radical philosophical positions. At bottom, in fact, there are only two contrasting positions: firm adherence to outer, worldly goals and values, and firm adherence to inner goals and values (500c). Some aspects of the contrast between inner and outer life are more or less self-evident to a reader of the dialogue. Plato makes abundant play with it, both in developed argument and in unacknowledged allusions (such as the contrast between Socrates' likely aphasia in a worldly court-486a-b, 521e-522a-and Callicles' in the underworld court of 526e-527a). Gorgias, for instance, thinks that freedom consists in the ability to do what you feel like doing, even at the expense of others' freedom; in this he is followed closely by both Polus and Callicles. Socrates, however, thinks of our freedom primarily in terms of whether we have inner masters set over us. At the very least, we should have no addictions or strong needs; it would be better to have reduced our needs until we are content with whatever is to hand. (Fs) (notabene)

Autor: Plato

Buch: Gorgias

Titel: Gorgias

Stichwort: arete (agathon, virtus) Worterklärung

Kurzinhalt: In origin, the word means 'the property of being male'

Textausschnitt: XVa However, the central term of Greek moral vocabulary reflects the contrast in a way which would have been more obvious to a member of Plato's original audience than it might be to us. The term is arete, which is usually translated 'virtue' or 'goodness'. It is the abstract noun associated with the adjective agathos, meaning 'good', and it therefore has as wide a range of applications as the adjective. We call a person morally good or good at weight-lifting, we call a knife good if it is effective at cutting, we call a soup good if it is tasty, and so on. In origin, the word means 'the property of being male' (as, in fact, does the Latin virtus, from which we get the English 'virtue'). This reflects its original usage when applied to human beings. 'Virtue' was assessed by one's external behaviour, and particularly by one's achievements in society and battle. Later, as this heroic code became less relevant to Greek culture, the meaning of arete changed somewhat, but still referred to external display?to holding high office in one's community, performing magnificent ritual offerings to the gods, and so on. (Fs) (notabene)

Autor: Plato

Buch: Gorgias

Titel: Gorgias

Stichwort: Sophisten, Rhetorik

Kurzinhalt: why an attack on rhetoric was critical for Plato. It lay at the heart of the outer values accepted and perpetuated by Gorgias

Textausschnitt: XVIa Now, the sophists too often claimed to be teaching arete (519c). Since they were teaching people how to get on in the world in some way or another, they clearly accepted the normal Greek definition of arete in terms of outer achievement. This is the context in which Socrates' interlocutors in Gorgias fit. Gorgias was explicitly teaching rhetoric to such career-oriented young men. Callicles' diatribe against the serious study and practice of philosophy (484c-486d) and his theme of playing Zethus to Socrates' Amphion (see the notes on 484e-486c and 506b) are Plato's brilliant ways of portraying a man protesting long and loud because he completely fails to understand the worth of the inner values championed by Socrates, for whom arete was an inner state, manifesting in one's external behaviour. As Plato says in Republic (which develops and expands many of the themes of Gorgias), a person should first put his own inner house in order, and then he can take part in public life, if he wants (443c-444a; compare Gorgias 527d). There is nothing to be gained, and a great deal to be lost, by performing magnificent ritual offerings to the gods when your mind is actually corrupt and irreligious. (Fs) (notabene)

XVIb We can again see, from this point of view, why an attack on rhetoric was critical for Plato. It lay at the heart of the outer values accepted and perpetuated by Gorgias and others like him. It lay in direct contrast with the whole teaching of Socrates. Since its most important public manifestation was in the lawcourts and assemblies of Athens, where it told people what to do, it could plausibly claim to be involved with matters of right and wrong, justice and injustice. But to Plato's mind, philosophy offered the only authentic way of life, and it was philosophy which truly dealt with right and wrong. Rhetoric had to be swept out of the way, as a spurious rival. Tenkku says (pp. 61-2),
Plato assumes that ignorance of the true good is the main reason for the moral corruption of his time. The rhetoricians claim to know the greatest human good. Their answer to this fundamental question is nonetheless completely wrong, according to Plato. By means of persuasion rhetoric is, however, able to mislead people in this important matter. Thus, in attacking rhetoric, Plato fights against the very roots of evil. (Fs)

Autor: Plato

Buch: Gorgias

Titel: Gorgias

Stichwort: eudaimonia; Wechselbeziehung: Rhetorik- Vergnügen; Hedonismus - widersprüchlich

Kurzinhalt: ... that he regards rhetoric and pleasure as essentially connected; He describes rhetoric as a species of flattery, and claims that flattery in all its guises aims for short-term pleasure rather than the good ...

Textausschnitt: XVIIa Another recurrent term in the dialogue is 'happiness', which translates the Greek eudaimonia (literally, 'being in a good state'). Again, this is a very flexible term. All Greeks, however sophisticated or unsophisticated they were, would have accepted eudaimonia as a description of what they wanted to get out of life; they were all 'eudaemonists'. Where they differed, however, was over what constitutes happiness. Is it a life of sensual pleasure which brings happiness, or what?

XVIIb In Greek, as in English, there is a natural connection between pleasure and happiness. We say, casually, 'Gardening makes me happy', meaning 'I enjoy gardening, I find it pleasant.' In Gorgias, however, Plato launches a strong attack against a type of hedonism, while simultaneously agreeing with the use of the term eudaimonia as a description of the aim of life. Moreover, in a dialogue which was certainly written not long before or after Gorgias- namely Protagoras-Socrates is made to espouse hedonism. We need to see what is going on. (Fs)

XVIIc It turns out that the topic of pleasure offers another route towards understanding Plato's dissatisfaction with rhetoric and the kinds of goals it entails. He makes it clear from the outset that he regards rhetoric and pleasure as essentially connected. He describes rhetoric as a species of flattery, and claims that flattery in all its guises aims for short-term pleasure rather than the good (464d). All you need in order to be a successful flatterer is enough experience of your human target to know what will please him or them (this is graphically portrayed at Republic 493a-c). So the problem with rhetoric is that it panders to its audience's short-term desires, and makes it difficult for them actually to think about what may or may not be better for them in the longer term. (Fs) (notabene)

XVIIIa Plato expresses the contrast at times very starkly. All branches of flattery aim only for pleasure, and all true tekhnai aim for the good of their subjects (464d-465a, 500a ff., 503a-b). He makes it sound as though pleasure and goodness are two incompatible things, so that one could only have one and not the other at the same time. However, I take it that the most accurate description of his position is that at 464d, where he says that branches of flattery are characterized by the fact that they aim for 'immediate pleasure'. This leaves open the possibility that long-term pleasure and goodness may still be related. (Fs) (notabene)

XVIIIb This is supported by a proper understanding of the anti-hedonist argument Socrates develops against Callicles (492d ff.). Again, Callicles is made out to be a champion of the immediate satisfaction of one's desires. His type of pleasure-seeker is entirely irrational: he doesn't allow the possibility of a person weighing up future pain against immediate pleasure and deciding to forgo that fifth cocktail. He doesn't allow the possibility of rational planning at all. If there is desire now for that fifth cocktail, then that desire had better be fulfilled if one is to be happy- that is Callicles' view, and that is the kind of hedonism which Plato and Socrates disavow. In fact, it is to Plato's credit that by means of the argument between Callicles and Socrates he allows us to distinguish between what may properly be called 'pleasure', and what should properly be called 'satisfaction of desire'. (Fs)

XVIIIc This type of hedonism was, for Plato, self-contradictory, since it emphasizes the satisfaction of desire, which is a kind of pain or discomfort. The more intense the pleasure, the more intense the desire. Therefore, to seek to maximize this kind of pleasure is to seek to maximize one's physical discomfort. However, he has nothing against a less intense kind of pleasure, which is to be found in philosophical activities, as long as these activities involve no preceding perceived pain, so that the pleasant component easily outweighs the unpleasant component. Throughout the dialogues (especially in Republic and Philebus) he expresses approval of these pleasures, and at Gorgias 499d ff. he expresses guarded approval of pleasures which promote genuine goods, such as health. The main differences between Plato and a Calliclean hedonist are that the latter seeks short-term gratification, whereas Plato looks for a life in which, in the long term, pleasure outweighs pain, and that a Calliclean hedonist makes desire-satisfaction his yardstick for assessing the goodness of an event, whereas for Plato pleasure was an accidental concomitant of events, which should in the first instance be assessed as good or bad by other criteria. (Fs) (notabene)

xixa So it is possible to read Gorgias as maintaining the natural connection between happiness and pleasure, provided that certain qualifications are in place. The good life as recommended by Socrates in Gorgias need not be entirely devoid of pleasure, but it must be genuinely good for the agent. Indeed, it seems that Plato would argue that we can only really be said to want something if it is genuinely good for us (468c). Since by definition we all want happiness, then if this phrase 'want happiness' is not to be a solecism of some kind, happiness must be genuinely good for us; it follows, according to Plato, that we do not really want anything other than virtue. (Again we find the idea that, according to Plato, the position he attributes to Socrates in Gorgias is the one held in fact, whether or not they are initially aware of it, by everyone.) It also follows that the path to virtue must be rational-must be a tekhne-since Plato effectively denies that we can be said to want happiness unless we can find some means towards the successful attainment of it (466b-468e), which involves the ability to distinguish between those pleasures which are good for us and those which are not (499d ff.). Since rhetoric is not a tekhne, it cannot be a means to happiness. (Fs) (notabene)

Autor: Plato

Buch: Gorgias

Titel: Gorgias

Stichwort: Prinzip der Souveränität der Tugend

Kurzinhalt: the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue. This principle holds that virtue is by far the most valuable thing in life.

Textausschnitt: XIXb We need to spell out in more detail what happiness consists in, according to Socrates. It consists in being moral, but the precise relationship between virtue and happiness in the Socratic dialogues is hard to ascertain. Gorgias is crucial, however, for the attempt to understand the relationship. Throughout the Socratic dialogues, Plato has Socrates assume some essential connection between virtue and happiness, but Gorgias is the only early or earlyish dialogue in which the connection is argued for at all. (Fs)

XXa Socrates agrees with his interlocutors that it is the possession of things that are good for a person which makes that person happy; where they differ is over what things are good for a person. Callicles thinks that unlimited sensual pleasure is good; we have already considered Socrates' disagreement with this view. Polus thinks it is good for one to have power over others, even to the extent of acting unjustly towards them; Socrates argues, by contrast, that immorality and injustice are bad for the agent, and even that they are worse for the agent than suffering the same injustice is to the sufferer. (Fs) (notabene)

Now if we consider even briefly the enormous evils that one can suffer unjustly, we can see how extraordinary this proposition is: one can be unjustly deprived of one's property, one can be unjustly expelled from one's city, one can have oneself and one's family unjustly enslaved, and one can be tortured unjustly, and unjustly be put to death [...] Socrates is arguing that in all these cases the man who does the injustice does thereby more harm to himself than the harm done to the sufferers of the injustice. (Fs) (notabene)
(Santas, p. 231)

XXb This strand within Gorgias is of a piece with a Socratic principle, exemplified by a number of passages in other dialogues too, which has become known in the scholarly literature as the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue. This principle holds that virtue is by far the most valuable thing in life. (Fs)
Whenever we must choose between exclusive and exhaustive alternatives which we have come to perceive as, respectively, just and unjust or, more generally, as virtuous and vicious, this very perception of them should decide our choice. Further deliberation would be useless, for none of the non-moral goods we might hope to gain, taken singly or in combination, could compensate us for the loss of a moral good. Virtue being the sovereign good in our domain of value, its claim upon us is always final. (Fs)
(Vlastos, Socrates, pp. 210-11)

XXIa In modern colloquial English, talk of 'virtue' can sound rather stuffy and Victorian; it can smack of doing one's duty without flinching, without minding the inconvenience. We need to remind ourselves, then, that what determines the value of virtue is, according to Socrates, that it makes the agent happy. It is good for me to be moral; it is bad for me to be immoral. Like everyone else, I aim in all I do for my own happiness. Socrates is saying that virtue, properly understood, brings happiness in its train. (Fs) (notabene)

XXIb Virtue is intrinsically good, then; but is it the only good thing there is? There is some ambiguity in the evidence, but in the early dialogues Socrates usually counts other things as good as well as virtue. A rough list, in order of importance to Socrates, would include, after virtue, physical health, fitness and good looks, and adequate wealth and social standing. See, for instance, Gorgias 467e-468b, 477a ff., 499c-500a. However, as Vlastos has argued persuasively, the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue still remains in place. These things are good in the sense that, as long as they do not interfere with a moral life, they are on balance to be preferred over their opposites; but even so, their value compared with virtue is utterly insignificant. If I had virtue, I would still count as happy without them, although I would be slightly happier with them; and I would still count as miserable if I had these external goods in abundance, but was immoral. (Fs) (notabene)

Autor: Plato

Buch: Gorgias

Titel: Gorgias

Stichwort: Verhältniss: Tugend - Glückseligkeit (happiness); Tugend als Mittel zur Glückseligkeit? (Irwin)

Kurzinhalt: ... they say that the value of virtue is purely instrumental: it is a means to happiness; Craft Analogy

Textausschnitt: XXIc Virtue is, on this view, the chief component of happiness. If asked what happiness consists in, Socrates would reply: above all, it consists in being moral and behaving morally. See his reply to Polus at 470e about the happiness of the Persian king. Other scholars (most notably Irwin), however, interpret the evidence differently. Rather than saying that virtue specifies, or all but specifies, the content of happiness, they say that the value of virtue is purely instrumental: it is a means to happiness. (Fs) (notabene)
XXIIa A reader might think that this is all a scholarly storm in a teacup. Both interpretations, he or she might say, are simply claiming in different ways that virtue makes me happy. But there is rather more to it than that. I have already mentioned that in normal language, happiness and pleasure operate in much the same way. Now, consider the sentence, 'Gardening gives me pleasure.' The pleasure which gardening gives me is just the pleasure of gardening; it cannot be any other kind of pleasure, such as the pleasure of hang-gliding. Pleasure is, in technical terminology, an epiphenomenon; a given pleasure attends a given activity and no other activity. (Fs) (notabene)

XXIIb Much the same is surely true of happiness (except that pleasure operates episode by episode, whereas happiness is more accurately assessed as an overall state). Happiness too is a state of being rather than an activity or set of activities. Its nature does not need extra specification: once you have specified the activity or activities which make you happy, you have gone as far as you can. Vlastos's interpretation satisfies this criterion: to say that virtue is the chief component of happiness is to say that happiness attends, above all, virtue. Irwin's instrumentalist interpretation, however, does not satisfy this criterion: it introduces such a gap between virtue and happiness that it is unclear what the content of happiness is. It is the equivalent of interpreting the sentence 'Gardening gives me pleasure' as if the pleasure was detachable from the gardening. (Fs) (notabene)

XXIIc Although I have not seen precisely this criticism of the instrumentalist view before, it may not be out of place to assure the reader that a majority of scholars nowadays would agree that Irwin's instrumentalist view is incorrect. It relies heavily on a feature which he calls the Craft Analogy. According to the Craft Analogy, the knowledge which, Socrates repeatedly tells us, is virtue, is like craft knowledge: just as a craft has a definite product, so virtue has a product and that product is happiness. However, this over-emphasizes one aspect of Socrates' talk about 'craft' {tekhne-see p. xi): not everything that is called a tekhne has a product. Within Gorgias, for instance, purely theoretical disciplines such as mathematics are called tekhnai (450d). So it is certainly not clear that in likening virtue to tekhnai Plato means us to infer that virtue has a product, namely happiness. What Socrates seems to mean by the so-called 'paradox' that virtue is knowledge is that virtue involves knowledge of what is good and bad for oneself. (Fs) (notabene)

Autor: Plato

Buch: Gorgias

Titel: Gorgias

Stichwort: Elenchus; Struktur des Elenchus (elenchos, refutatio)

Kurzinhalt: Logische Struktur des Standard Elenchus mit Beispiel

Textausschnitt: XXVIIb The logical structure of the standard elenchus is straightforward. An interlocutor proposes a thesis (p); Socrates gains his assent to other theses (q, r, s ...); Socrates demonstrates that {q, r, s} themselves, or their consequences, contradict p; faced with a choice between p and not-p, the interlocutor gives up p. (Fs) (notabene)

As an example, consider the structure of the argument between Socrates and Polus at 466b-468e:

p Polus maintains that rhetoricians are powerful because they do what they want;
q Polus agrees that power is a good thing for its possessor;
r Polus agrees that we only ever want what is good for us. (Fs)

XXVIIb Now, whatever the strengths and weaknesses of the argument Socrates develops against Polus (see the relevant notes on this section), it is clear that he uses Polus' assent to q and r to argue that rhetoricians do not have power-i.e. not-p. (Fs) (notabene)

Autor: Plato

Buch: Gorgias

Titel: Gorgias

Stichwort: Callicles (Kallikles) über Philosophie; Sokrates

Kurzinhalt: ... when I see an older man who hasn't dropped philosophy, but is still practising it, Socrates, I think it is he who deserves a thrashing.

Textausschnitt: A certain amount of philosophy helps one to become a cultured person, and it's fine to take it that far; there's nothing wrong with studying philosophy in one's teens. But it's a ridiculous thing for a person still to be studying philosophy even later in life, Socrates. I feel the same way about doing (485b) philosophy as I do about stammering and playfulness. I enjoy seeing a child stammer and play games when he's still young enough for this kind of behaviour to be expected from him; it's pleasantly unaffected, I think, and appropriate to the child's age. When I hear a young child coming out with fluent sentences, however, it seems harsh, grates on my ears, and strikes me as degrading somehow. On the other hand, the phenomenon of a grown man stammering or playing childish games seems (485c) ridiculous and immature, and you want to give him a good thrashing. (Fs; 67f) (notabene)

That's how I feel about people who do philosophy as well. I don't mind seeing a young lad take up philosophy: it seems perfectly appropriate. It shows an open mind, I think, whereas neglect of philosophy at this age signifies pettiness and condemns a man to a low estimation of his own worth and potential. (485d) On the other hand, when I see an older man who hasn't dropped philosophy, but is still practising it, Socrates, I think it is he who deserves a thrashing. You see, as I said a moment ago, under these circumstances even a naturally gifted person isn't going to develop into a real man, because he's avoiding the heart of his community and the thick of the agora, which are the places where, as Homer tells us, a man 'earns distinction'.1 Instead he spends the rest of his life sunk out of sight, whispering in a corner with three or four young men, rather than giving open (485e) expression to important and significant ideas. (Fs)

I'm quite fond of you, Socrates, and that's why I react to you in the same way, as it happens, that Euripides had Zethus (whose words I quoted a moment ago) react to Amphion. I'm moved to copy Zethus ta

Autor: Plato

Buch: Gorgias

Titel: Gorgias

Stichwort: Ist das Angenehme das Gute? Selbstdisziplin als Ordnung des Geistes; Hedonismus; das Gute als Grund der Lust oder umgekehrt

Kurzinhalt: Is the pleasant the same as the good? ... We shouldn't refuse to restrain our desires, because that condemns us to a life of endlessly trying to satisfy them

Textausschnitt: Socrates: Here goes, then. I'll review the whole argument so far. Is the pleasant the same as the good? No, they're different. Callicles and I agreed on that. (Fs; 103f) (notabene: Zusammenfassung)

Should the good be the reason we do pleasant things, or the pleasant be the reason we do good things? The good should be the reason we do pleasant things. (Fs)

Isn't it the quality of being pleasant which makes (506d) us enjoy things, and the quality of being good which makes us good?

Yes. (Fs)

Now, what does it take to be a good human being? What does it take to be a good anything, in fact? It always takes a specific state of goodness, doesn't it? I don't see how we can deny that, Callicles. (Fs)

And whether we're talking about a good artefact, a good body, a good mind for that matter, or a good creature, what it takes for these states of goodness to occur in an ideal form is not chaos, but organization and perfection and the particular branch of expertise whose province the object in question is. Right? I agree. (506e) (Fs)

In every case, then, a good state is an organized and orderly state, isn't it? I'd say so. (Fs)

So a thing has to be informed by a particular orderly structure-the structure appropriate to it-to be good, doesn't it? I think so. (Fs)

Doesn't it follow that a mind possessed of its proper structure is better than a disordered mind? It's bound to be. (Fs)

But a 'mind possessed of orderly structure' is an orderly mind, isn't it? Naturally. (Fs)

And an orderly mind is a self-disciplined mind?

Absolutely. (507a) (Fs)

From which it follows that a self-disciplined mind is a good mind. Now, I can't see anything wrong with this argument, Callicles, but if you can, please tell me what it is. (Fs)
Callicles: Just get on with it, Socrates.

Socrates: All right. If a self-disciplined mind is good, then a mind in the opposite state is bad. In other words, an undisciplined and self-indulgent mind is bad. Yes. (Fs; 104f)

Now, a disciplined person must act in an appropriate m

Autor: Plato

Buch: Gorgias

Titel: Gorgias

Stichwort: Sokrates als einzig wahrer Politiker in Athen; Gleichnis: Arzt und Koch -> Verteidigungsrede vor Kindern

Kurzinhalt: I'm the only genuine practitioner of politics in Athens today ... How do you think a doctor would defend himself if he were up before that kind of court? The prosecutor would argue, 'Children, ...

Textausschnitt: Socrates: I'd really have to be a fool, Callicles, to believe that here in Athens anyone is immune to anything. One thing I'm sure of, though, is that if I do get taken to court and run any of the risks you're talking about, it'll be a bad person who's taken me (521d) there, since no good person could take an innocent man to court. And it's quite possible that I'd be put to death. Shall I tell you why I think so?

Callicles: Yes, please. (Fs)

Socrates: There may be one or two others, but I think I'm the only genuine practitioner of politics in Athens today, the only example of a true statesman.1 So because moral improvement rather than gratification and pleasure is always the reason for my saying anything, and because I refuse to take the subtle (521e) route2 you're recommending, I'll be tongue-tied in court. The argument I used before, when I was talking to Polus3, is relevant to the situation I'll be in. My trial will be equivalent to a doctor being prosecuted by a cook before a jury of young children. How do you think a doctor would defend himself if he were up before that kind of court? The prosecutor would argue, 'Children, the defendant has committed numerous crimes against your honoured selves. He has ruined the youngest among you4 with his surgery and cautery and baffled them with compresses and nauseants; he gives them harsh potions and forces (522a) them to go without food and drink. He's not like me: I'm constantly giving you all kinds of delicious treats.' In these dire straits, what do you think a doctor could find to say? What do you suppose would happen if he told the truth and said, 'All my actions, children, have been prompted by a concern for health.' Can you imagine the hue and cry our jurors would raise at that? It would be enormous, wouldn't it? (Fs; 127f) (notabene)
Callicles: I suppose so. (Fs)
Socrates: Of course it would. And don't you think he'd (522b) be completely stuck for words?
Callicles: Yes. (Fs)
Socrates: Well, that's an analogy for what will certainly happen to me

Autor: Plato

Buch: Gorgias

Titel: Gorgias

Stichwort: Sokrates Schlussrede; Reflexion über eine Gerechtigkeit nach dem Tod

Kurzinhalt: So I'll ignore the public honours which attract most people, follow the path of truth, and try to be as moral a person as I can during my lifetime and after my death as well.

Textausschnitt: Socrates: Pay attention, then, as they say. It's an (523a) excellent explanation. I expect you'll think that what I'm about to tell you is just a story, but to my mind it does explain things, since it is, as far as I'm concerned, the truth.1 (Fs) (notabene)

As Homer records, when Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto inherited their father's dominion, they divided it between themselves.2 Now, during Cronus' reign human beings were subject to a law which the gods sanction even to this day and which is as follows: any human being who has lived a moral and god-fearing life shall on his death depart for the Isles of the Blessed (523b) and shall dwell there, and live a trouble-free life of perfect happiness; however, anyone who has lived an immoral and godless life shall be imprisoned in the place of retribution and justice, which is called Tartarus.3 In the time of Cronus, and in the relatively recent past during Zeus' reign as well, living judges dealt with living people and passed judgement upon them on the day of their impending death, which made the administration of justice poor. So Pluto and the supervisors of the Isles of the Blessed came and told Zeus that the wrong kinds of people were getting through to both places. So Zeus said, 'I'll put an end to that. The reason (523c) the administration of justice is poor at the moment is that people are being assessed with their clothes on, in the sense that they come before the court during their lifetimes, and plenty of people with corrupt souls are dressed in attractive bodies, noble birth, and wealth; also, when it's their turn to be judged, a lot of witnesses come forward and testify to the (523d) exemplary lives these people have led. All this impresses the judges. Besides, the judges themselves are wearing clothes as well: their souls are enclosed within eyes and ears and bodies in general. All this-their own clothing and that of the people they're assessing-constitutes a barrier. The first job', he went on, 'is to stop people knowing in advance when they're going to

Autor: Plato

Buch: Republic

Titel: Republic

Stichwort: Plato, Ring des Gyges

Kurzinhalt: 'Suppose there were two such rings, then-one worn by our moral person, the other by the immoral person. There is no one, on this view, who is iron-willed enough to maintain his morality ...

Textausschnitt: (359c) thought-experiment. Suppose we grant both types of people--moral and immoral--the scope to do whatever they want, and we then keep an eye on them to see where their wishes lead them. We'll catch our moral person red-handed: his desire for superiority will point him in the same direction as the immoral person, towards a destination which every creature naturally regards as good and aims for, except that people are compelled by convention to deviate from this path and respect equality.
'They'd have the scope I'm talking about especially if they acquired the kind of power which, we hear, an ancestor of Gyges of Lydia1 once acquired. He was a shepherd in the (359d) service of the Lydian ruler of the time, when a heavy rainstorm occurred and an earthquake cracked open the land to a certain extent,2 and a chasm appeared in the region where he was pasturing his flocks. He was fascinated by the sight, and went down into the chasm and saw there, as the story goes, among other artefacts, a bronze horse, which was hollow and had windows set in it; he stooped and looked in through the windows and saw a corpse inside, which seemed to be that of a giant. The corpse was naked, but had a golden ring on one finger; he took the ring off the finger and left.
Now, the (359e) shepherds used to meet once a month to keep the king informed about his flocks, and our protagonist came to the meeting wearing the ring. He was sitting down among the others, and happened to twist the ring's bezel in the direction of his body, towards the inner part of his hand. When he did this, he became invisible to his neighbours, and to his astonishment (360a) they talked about him as if he'd left. While he was fiddling about with the ring again, he turned the bezel outwards, and became visible. He thought about this and experimented to see if it was the ring which had this power; in this way he eventually found that turning the bezel inwards made him invisible and turning it outwards made him visible. As soon as he realized this, he arranged to be one of the delegates to the king; once he was inside the palace, he seduced the king's wife (360b) and with her help assaulted and killed the king, and so took possession of the throne.

'Suppose there were two such rings, then-one worn by our moral person, the other by the immoral person. There is no one, on this view, who is iron-willed enough to maintain his morality and find the strength of purpose to keep his hands off what doesn't belong to him, when he is able to take whatever he wants from the market-stalls without fear of being (360c) discovered, to enter houses and sleep with whomever he chooses, to kill and to release from prison anyone he wants, and generally to act like a god among men. His behaviour would be identical to that of the other person: both of them would be heading in the same direction.

'Now this is substantial evidence, it would be claimed, that morality is never freely chosen. People do wrong whenever they think they can, so they act morally only if they're forced to, because they regard morality as something which isn't good for one personally. The point is that everyone thinks the rewards of (360d) immorality far outweigh those of morality--and they're right, according to the proponent of this view. The sight of someone with that kind of scope refusing all those opportunities for wrongdoing and never laying a finger on things that didn't belong to him would lead people to think that he was in an extremely bad way, and was a first-class fool as well-even though their fear of being wronged might make them attempt to mislead others by singing his praises to them in public.

Autor: Plato

Buch: Gorgias

Titel: Gorgias

Stichwort: Seele: Gericht, Weltgericht

Kurzinhalt: Once the soul has been stripped of the body, all its features become obvious; ... that the promiscuity, sensuality, brutality, and self-indulgence of his behaviour has thoroughly distorted the harmony and beauty of his soul

Textausschnitt: Well, Callicles, I think the same goes for the soul too. Once the soul has been stripped of the body, all its features become obvious-its innate features and also the attributes the person has lodged in his soul through his behaviour in particular situations. So when people come before their judge, as Asians do before Rhadamanthys, for instance, then (524e) Rhadamanthys makes them stand there and examines their souls one by one. He doesn't know whose soul it is; in fact, he might well get hold of the soul of the king of Persia or some other king or potentate and notice that it's riddled with defects-scourged and covered in the scars which every dishonest and (525a) unjust action has imprinted on it, utterly crippled by lies and arrogance and warped by a truth-free diet- and he'd also see that the promiscuity, sensuality, brutality, and self-indulgence of his behaviour has thoroughly distorted the harmony and beauty of his soul. When he sees a soul in this state, he immediately dispatches it in disgrace to prison, where it will undergo the appropriate treatment. (525b) (Fs)

What is appropriate? As long as the person inflicting the punishment is justified in doing so, then every instance of punishment should either help its recipient by making him a better person or should act as an example for others, in the sense that the terrifying sight of the victim's sufferings helps them to improve.1 (525c) Those who are benefited by being punished (whether the agents of punishment are divine or human) are those whose faults are curable; nevertheless, it remains the case both here and in Hades that it takes pain and torment to produce the benefit, since that is the only way in which injustice can be removed. Those who act as examples, on the other hand, are those who have committed such awful crimes that they've become incurable. Although this means that they themselves are past help, others can be helped by watching them suffer for ever the worst, most agonizing, and most terrifying torments imaginable as a result of their sins. Their only purpose is to hang there in their prison in Hades as visible deterrents for every new criminal who arrives there. (Fs)

(525d) If what Polus says is true,2 then in my opinion Archelaus will become one of these deterrents, and he'll be joined by anyone else who's a dictator like him. In fact, I think most of those who act as examples are drawn from the ranks of dictators, kings, potentates, and politicians, because they're the ones who can and do commit the most terrible and immoral crimes. Homer testifies to this,3 since in his poems those who are condemned to be punished for ever in (132d) Hades are kings and potentates such as Tantalus, Sisyphus, and Tityus. However, no poet portrays Thersites (or anyone else who may have been bad, but who wasn't involved in public life) as an incurable criminal in the grip of terrible punishment, and I imagine it's because he didn't have the same scope for wrongdoing that he's better off than those who did. No, Callicles, it's power that leads men to plumb the depths of depravity. (526a) (Fs; 132f)

All the same, there's nothing to stop good men gaining power too, and those who do deserve our wholehearted admiration, because it's not easy, Callicles, and therefore particularly commendable, to have so much opportunity for wrongdoing and yet to live a moral life. Few people manage it. I mean, there have been paragons like that both here in Athens and elsewhere, and I think more will appear in the future too, who practise the virtue of moral management of the affairs entrusted to them. In fact, one of them-Aristides the son of Lysimachus-became famous (526b) throughout Greece, not just locally. But power usually corrupts people, my friend. (Fs)

Anyway, to recapitulate, when Rhadamanthys gets hold of someone like that, he doesn't even know his name or his background; all he knows is that he's a bad man. Once he's seen this about him, he puts a token4 on him to indicate whether in his opinion the person is curable or incurable, and then has him led away to Tartarus, where he undergoes the appropriate treatment. Occasionally, however, he comes across a different kind of soul, one which has lived a life of (526c) moral integrity, and which belonged to a man who played no part in public life or-and this is the most likely possibility, in my opinion, Callicles5-to a philosopher who minded his own business and remained detached from things throughout his life. When this happens, Rhadamanthys is delighted and sends him away to the Isles of the Blessed. Aeacus goes through exactly the same procedure.6 Minos sits there overseeing the whole process, and while the other two each hold a staff, he alone has a golden sceptre. That's how Homer's Odysseus saw him, 'with (526d) sceptre of gold, dispensing right among the dead'.7