Datenbank/Lektüre


Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Inverse Einsicht

Kurzinhalt: Definition: inverse Einsicht,

Textausschnitt: () The inverse insight grasps that, contrary to all expectations, there is nothing to be understood in a particular situation or question. It is not a simple failure to understand, but a positive grasp; yet the grasp is to the effect that the situation is unintelligible. To put it another way, an inverse insight grasps at once a situation, a question, and the fact of an incommensurability between the two. An inverse insight, then, grasps not what is right with the answer, but what is wrong with the question.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Heuristik, Lonergan

Kurzinhalt: Lonergan, heuristische Struktur

Textausschnitt: () ... heuristic. Lonergan uses the word to describe the strategy of moving from question to insight.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Bewusstsein, Definition

Kurzinhalt: Bewusstsein: Haben des Objektes, Rotkehlchen, Ich-Bewusstsein, "Haben" der inneren u. äußeren Erfahrung

Textausschnitt: () More fully, consciousness is an awareness of an object, an act, and the self. 'I see the robin' was the first and simplest example given of experience. The experience is, obviously and primarily, an awareness of the robin. But it is also an awareness of the 'seeing.' It is not that I see the robin unconsciously, and that I become conscious when I start to think about the 'seeing'; I am already dimly conscious of the act of seeing.
()
Once more, I am also dimly aware of the 'I.' It is not that I am aware of the robin, and only become conscious of the I when I ask, who is seeing the robin? I am already conscious of the I. If not, I would

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Wissensstreben, desire to kno

Kurzinhalt: drive to know, dynamische Struktur, Eros des Strebens, Begehren von Nahrung

Textausschnitt: () The structure of experience - insight - judgment given above is static. But the human cognitional process is dynamic. It is always in movement, in virtue of what Lonergan calls 'the drive to know.
()
It is the wonder that Aristotle identified as the beginning of philosophy in his Metaphysics. The drive to know has an object which is not as tangible as food, nor as palpable as a sexual partner. Yet there is a hunger and an eros of the mind that is quite as real as the desire for food or sex.
()
A person can experience the drive to know as a compelling curiosity that rouses one from the lethargy of sense reverie to the stern task of understanding, that also applies to that understanding the imperious test of reflection, and then moves one from any particular judgment to further experiences, further questions, further insights. Can the drive to know be applied to itself? Perhaps it already has.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Definition, Erfahrung, Bewusstsein, Einsicht, Urteil

Kurzinhalt: Definition der am Erkenntnisprozess beteiligten Elemente: Experience, Consciousness, Imagining, Insight, Conception, Judgment

Textausschnitt: () Since the concept is closely linked with definition, it may be helpful here to offer definitions of all the mental activities recognized.
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Experience is that mental activity which provides the initial materials for cognitional process.
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Consciousness is that mental activity by which we are aware of object, act, and self.
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Imagining is that mental activity by which we re-present the apprehensions of sense or consciousness.
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The insight is that mental activity which grasps a pattern in the previously disorganized data of sense, consciousness, or imagination.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Inkohärenz, Selbstwiderspruch, Urteil

Kurzinhalt: Selbstwiderspruch in der Aussage: es gibt kein Urteil; logischer Widerspruch; Inkohärenz zw. Aussage und Tätigkeit

Textausschnitt: () It is incoherent to make a judgment, There is no judgment. This is not exactly a logical contradiction. A logical contradiction exists when two propositions are diametrically opposed (e.g., judgment exists, and judgment does not exist). In this case, there is only one proposition. There is no judgment. That proposition stands in tension, not with another proposition, but with the mental activity of affirming it, the very act of judging.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Wissenschaft, innere, äußere, Unterschied, Hauptbegriffe; Irreversibilität

Kurzinhalt: Unterschied: Naturwissenschaft, Wissenschaft des Bewusstsein, Grundbegriffe, Newton, reflexive Erkenntnis (eg), Revision (Arten)

Textausschnitt: () The point to be grasped is that basic terms in the physical sciences are matters of discovery, and new discoveries may always make old ones outdated. Basic terms come and go; only the method of the physical sciences remains constant. (106; Fs)
433 The basic terms of the science of consciousness, however, will not be subject to revision. For they are the mental activities themselves, and, as seen in the last chapter, those activities are, in a certain sense, self-justifying. Trying to revise them would only land the prospective reviser in incoherence.
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Revision, then, can occur only if there appear new data, or if old data are given a new understanding. It can only take place by appeal to experience or insight. But one can hardly appeal to experience to revise the activity of experience
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To put it another way, a revision implies a new judgment, which states something to be the case which is at variance with the old judgment. Making such a judgment requires evidence; otherwise it will be unreasonable. But a judgment takes a stand on prior insights and experiences; and so a new judgment, as just seen, will require either new experience, or new insights, or both.
()
The reason, of course, that the basic terms of cognitional science are not revisable, while those of the natural sciences are, is that in the natural sciences the activities of the mind are turned upon the data of sense, offered by the physical world, while the mental activities, in the science of consciousness, return upon themselves. In the science being proposed, then, the mental activities are explicitly, deliberately, and systematically turned upon themselves, in contrast to the sporadic and partial attention they receive in common-sense awareness.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Wissenschaft, innere, äußere, Descartes

Kurzinhalt: Cogito, ergo sum; cogito, ergo cogito; Lonergan - Descartes; Denken -> Existenz; Syllogismus; Ausgang, Anfang des Erkenntnisprozesses

Textausschnitt: () Whatever thinks, exists.
But I think.
Therefore I exist.
()
... 'Cogito, ergo cogito': 'I think, therefore I think.' That may appear so modest as to be a mere tautology, except that the 'I think' is not the same in both cases. In the first instance it refers to an activity; in the second, to a judgment.
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One cannot demonstrate such starting points, for the very attempt to do so will inevitably appeal to those starting points themselves. One does not demonstrate any of the mental activities, then, but discovers them; or perhaps better
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The proper method of interior science, then, is not demonstration, but discovery: the experience, the understanding, and the judgment as to what my mental activities in fact are. But once those activities are called to attention, understood, and organized in this more modest way, one has nevertheless an indubitable basis for the further pursuit of the science of consciousness.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Letztbegründung, Selbstwiderspruch, Logik

Kurzinhalt: Ultimate Justification, cognitional process, reflection on knowing, Denkprozess als Prämisse und Conclusio

Textausschnitt: () Cognitional process, it has been maintained, is self-justifying, in that the very exercise of the activities involved makes their simultaneous denial incoherent.
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Note that one is using cognitional process to ground the conclusion. But the conclusion to be reached can never be firmer than the process itself used to reach it. Therefore the foundation for cognitional process can never be firmer than cognitional process itself.
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A comparison might be made here to logic. It is well known that a conclusion can be no stronger than its premises. Conceive here, then, a super-logic, in which the ultimate premise is not any particular proposition, but cognitional process itself.
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To put the point another way, the process of knowing precedes the reflection on knowing. Thus common-sense awareness precedes the natural sciences, and the natural sciences precede the science of cognition. The science of consciousness can give definition and order to the process that precedes it.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Epistemologie, Erkenntnistheorie, Jesus, Höhlenmythos; Johannesevangelium, der ungläubige Thomas, Höhle ->Schatten,

Kurzinhalt: Blest are they who have not seen and have believed' (John 20:9). Reality, then, is larger and grander than what can be seen. The gospel is diametrically opposed to any empiricism.

Textausschnitt: 480 Jesus is not usually thought of as an epistemologist. Yet there are epistemological implications to some of his statements. This is particularly true of a story toward the end of John's Gospel. Jesus appeared to his disciples on the night of Easter, but Thomas was not with them. When told of the encounter, Thomas was sceptical. He would not believe unless he could put his finger into Jesus' wounds. A week later, Jesus appears again, and Thomas is with the disciples. Jesus invites Thomas to do just as he had demanded, rebuking him for his disbelief. Thomas makes the profession of faith which forms the literary climax of the Gospel; but Jesus points up the moral of the story: 'You became a believer because you saw me. Blest are they who have not seen and have believed' (John 20:9). Reality, then, is larger and grander than what can be seen. The gospel is diametrically opposed to any empiricism. (117; Fs)

481 That same message may also be the deepest meaning of the myth of the cave. It concerns two criteria of reality. On the one hand, there is the criterion that most people adopt, the spontaneous empiricism that identifies knowing with experience. But such people are deceived. What they see are mere shadows, though they take them to be realities: 'Do you not think they would suppose that in naming the things that they saw they were naming passing objects?' Again, what they heard were not true voices, but echoes: 'And if their prison had an echo from the wall opposite them, when one of the passers-by uttered a sound, do you think that they would suppose anything else than the passing shadow to be the speaker?' In other words, the prisoners of the cave take shadows and echoes to be reality: 'Then in every way such prisoners would deem reality to be nothing else than the shadows of artificial objects.' Such a confusion is the natural human condition, Socrates implies. For when Glaucon confesses this to be a strange image, and these strange prisoners, Socrates says, 'Like to us.' (117; Fs)

482 But there is a release and a healing to such confusion. It comes when the knower - perhaps against any natural inclinations - is freed from his shackles, allowed to turn around, and face the light itself. In this way he is able to approach reality in its true nature: 'What do you suppose would be his answer if someone told him that what he had seen before was all a cheat and an illusion, but that now, being nearer to reality and turned toward more real things, he saw more truly?' The process is not easy, and the habituation would take time. But eventually the person would be able to see the sun, the very source of light, in its own reality: 'And so, finally, I suppose he would be able to look upon the sun itself and see its true nature, not by reflections in water or phantasms of it in an alien setting, but in and by itself in its own place.' (117f; Fs)

483 Almost all the terms for mental activities, it was pointed out in chapter 3, are taken from metaphors from sense experience. Thus 'insight' means, literally, 'looking into.' Perhaps now the importance of this observation can be appreciated. Since sense experience is more obvious, and inner experience more hidden, this appeal is natural and appropriate; and it does no harm as long as it is kept in mind that the expression is metaphorical. The problems begin when the expression is taken literally. Then one falls into the empiricist trap of identifying knowing with looking, believing with seeing. (118; Fs)

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Erkenntnistheorie, Maßstab, Augustinus

Kurzinhalt: Confessiones, Augustins Empirismus u. Materialismus, Ambrosius

Textausschnitt: () ... but once the basic structure is established, the question can be turned around: Are other accounts of knowing adequate? Thus the structure of knowing may exercise a critical function in assessing the history of philosophy.
()
Augustine's Confessions. He began with a position in which the only realities he recognized were bodily ones. If he thought of spiritual realities, he nevertheless could not imagine them except as bodies. He speaks of 'spiritual things of which I was unable to think, except corporeally'

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Erkenntnistheorie, Maßstab, Descartes

Kurzinhalt: Wahrheit im Begriff, Fehlen der Stufe des Urteils, Cogito, ergo sum argument

Textausschnitt: () Descartes saw in the clear and distinct concept the very criterion of truth. This realization came to him as a by-product of the 'Cogito, ergo sum' argument.
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... I come to the conclusion that I might assume, as a general rule, that the things which we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true ...
()
... it seems to me that already I can establish that as a general rule that all things which I perceive very clearly and very distinctly are true ...
() On the other hand, his account of cognition is still partial, for he overlooks the level of reflection, and the key contribution of judgment.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Erkenntnistheorie, Maßstab, Kant

Kurzinhalt: Begriff, Anschauung, concept, intuition; Kant: Empirist u.Idealist (Konzeptualist)

Textausschnitt: () 'Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind' (eg: 'Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.) ... Though Kant, as well as Descartes, is often called an idealist, because of his stress on concepts, there are also ways in which, insisting on the double criterion of concept and sense experience, he remains an empiricist. He rules out most metaphysical questions as illegitimate, precisely because they are beyond the physical, that is, beyond sense experience or intuition. In this regard his position is the same as the early Augustine's: nothing can be real if it is not a body.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Erkenntnistheorie, Maßstab, Thomas

Kurzinhalt: Urteil: Kriterium der Wahrheit, Definition v. Wahrheit, Sth, F1_016 q2, Erkenntnistheorie als Maßstab für Philosophiegeschichte, Realismus, Empirismus, Idealismus

Textausschnitt: () Thomas's argument begins with the definition of truth: it is the conformity of mind with reality. So to know truth is to know that conformity. It is not enough to be in conformity with reality, then; one must also know the conformity. But the senses, though they may be in conformity with reality, do not know the conformity: hence truth is not to be sought there. Again, an insight or a concept may be in conformity with reality; but it does not know that conformity, for the question has not yet arisen. Is that true? The conformity of mind and reality is only known, then, in judgment.
()
Accordingly truth is defined as conformity between intellect and thing. Hence to know that conformity is to know truth. Sense however does not know that conformity in any way; for although sight possesses the likeness of the visible thing, it does not know the correspondence between the thing and what it apprehends about it. Intellect can know its own conformity to the thing known; yet it does not grasp that conformity in the mere act of knowing the essence of a thing. But when the intellect judges that the thing corresponds to the form of the thing which it apprehends then for the first time it knows and affirms truth. [...] Therefore properly speaking truth is in the intellect in its function of affirming and denying one reality of another; and not in sense, nor in intellect knowing the meaning
()
Here is the way that Thomas himself explains it: ... eg. Das erkannte Ding ist Form des Intellekts ...
()
But perhaps enough has been said to suggest how one might construct a whole history of philosophy from the critical standpoint of the structure of consciousness.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Metaphysik, Grunstrukturen, Potenz, Form, Akt, Substanz, Accidenz

Kurzinhalt: Metapher: Schlüssel, Substanz: Realist, Empirist; empirischer Zugang zur metaphys. Struktur

Textausschnitt: ... the master key of all master keys. But even a master key, which can fit many locks, still has some kind of structure. So it should be possible to say something about the lock ...
()
Structure of Knowing Structure of Known
Judgment Affirmable Existence
Insight Intelligible Form
Experience Experience-able Potency
()
Note that potency, form, and existence are not three distinct things, as if by experience we know one thing, by insight another, and by judgment a third. The activities of knowing are not isolated, but are intimately related to each other:

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Metaphysik, Moral, Gut, Streben, Habitus

Kurzinhalt: Dualität des Strebens, Moralität als Anwendung des Wissens auf das Tun; Aristoteles, Plato, Paulus; Einübung in Tugend, desire for the god, Maßstab: Vernünftigkeit; Hedonismus

Textausschnitt: () The human good, then, is the object of human desire.
()
Judgment Affirmable good - good of value
Insight Intelligible good - good of order
Experience Experiential good - felt good
()
Not surprisingly, the two moralities diverge. There are times when the pleasurable action is not a reasonable one, and there are also times when the reasonable action requires the endurance of labor, hardship, and pain.
()
Growth in moral maturity, then, is largely a training in virtuous habits; and teaching morality will be largely a matter of teaching virtue.
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Everything said so far may be summarized in the major precept of morality, Do good and avoid evil, where good is the truly reasonable action, and evil is the unreasonable action. That may seem cruelly general, to the point of being almost useless. But as the inner journey yields in metaphysics only the general structure of the known, without determining any particulars, so the present account of morality must be content with this general precept.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Definition, Sein, Gut, Streben, uneingeschränkt, Wissen, Gut

Kurzinhalt: Sein als Objekt des uneingeschränkten Strebens; drive to know, desire for god; Wissen - Wille; Genesis

Textausschnitt: () Most simply and comprehensively, then, being may be defined as the object of the pure desire to know.
()
The drive to know goes beyond any limits; if the parallel holds, then the will's desire for good also goes beyond any limits.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Gott, Idee, Definition, geistig (spiritual), Seinsentfaltungen

Kurzinhalt: Idee Gottes: eins, einfach, unabhängig, vollkommen, unbegrenzt, geistig, Entfaltungen der Einsicht; Identität: Urteil, Einsicht; Wissen: Dualität, Einheit, Aristoteles: Self-thinking Thought

Textausschnitt: () As an approach to the understanding of God, postulate an insight adequate to being.
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This insight will be one.
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The insight adequate to being will be simple.
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The insight adequate to being will also be independent.
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The insight adequate to being will be unlimited.
()
The unlimited insight will be spiritual () timeless () self-explanatory () judgment
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... the unlimited insight is judgment as well as insight.
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Here the difference of cognitional theories becomes significant. In the myth of knowing as looking, knowing is an ultimate duality, including the looker and the looked-at.
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The question is answered by pointing out that, if there are any intelligibles other than the Primary Intelligible, the Primary Insight understands them by understanding the Primary Intelligible. In other words, in understanding itself the Primary Insight understands also the various ways in which it may be reflected in other intelligibles.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Gott, Idee, Schemata, Identität, Sein, Wesen

Kurzinhalt: Schemata, Identität von Sein u. Wesen (esse, existencia); Denkschritt: Erste Einsicht -> Erstes Seiendes

Textausschnitt: ()
Judgment Equals Existence
Equals Equals
Insight Equals Form
()
... the essence and the existence of the Primary Insight are identical.
()
If the Primary Insight is one with its Existence, it follows that the Primary Insight is also the Primary Being.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Erste Einsicht, Sein, Sprache, Reden, analog, Gott, Idee, Analogie, metaphorisch

Kurzinhalt: Analoges Sprechen über Sein, Extrapolation, indirekte Erkenntnis des Seins, Aussagen über Gott, weise, gut, liebend, allmächtig, metaphorisches Reden, Erste Ursache, Idee Gottes

Textausschnitt: () Being was understood by an extrapolation from the structure of knowing; it was indirectly defined as the object of the pure desire to know. The Primary Insight was a further extrapolation, indirectly defined as the insight adequate to being. Such indirect speech is usually termed analogical.
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Thus an Unlimited Insight is somewhat similar, and somewhat dissimilar, from an ordinary insight. It has something in common, because the ordinary insight is an act of understanding, and the Unlimited Insight is an act of understanding. At the same time, the acts of understanding are quite different, because one is limited, and the other unlimited
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So a characteristic may be predicated of the Primary Insight. For example, it may be said that the Primary Insight is wise. For wisdom is a certain perfection of knowing, and the Primary Insight is perfect knowing. Yet wise is not predicated of the Primary Substance as an accident of a substance, for the Primary Substance has no accidents.What is actually being predicated is not an accident wise but a substantial Wisdom. Further, that Wisdom is not other than the Primary Insight itself, for the Primary Insight is simple.
()
But the one, simple, infinite, eternal, omniscient, and omnipotent spiritual substance which is the knowing and loving cause of all things is what is traditionally known as God.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Gott, Existenz, Gottesbeweis, Anselm, Descartes

Kurzinhalt: Ontologischer Gottesbeweis, begrenzte Idee des Unbegrenzten, Notwenddigkeit des Urteils im Argument

Textausschnitt: () If the human being grasped the unlimited insight directly, then the existence of God would be self-evident: ... As it is, the human being grasps the unlimited insight only indirectly, by analogy by an extrapolation.
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Again the influence of cognitional theory is significant here. If one holds with Descartes that the criterion of truth is the clear and distinct idea, then the clear and distinct idea of God implies the existence of God.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Gott, Existenz, Gottesbeweis, Thomas, Lonergan, 2 logische Möglichkeiten

Kurzinhalt: 2 Grundalternative; Universum: intelligibel - oder nicht, sinnvoll - absurd; Sartre, Gottesfrage, Moral, performativer Selbstwiderspruch in der Leugnung Gottes

Textausschnitt: () The first is from change in creatures to their unchanged cause; the second is from created effects to the first cause. The third argues from contingent being to necessary being. The fourth begins with created grades of perfection and rises to the most excellent and perfect being. The fifth argues from purpose and design in nature to its Universal Intender. Lonergan, in chapter 19 of Insight, offers one demanding and challenging proof which formulates the basic principle of all the Thomistic proofs.
()
Either God exists, or
God does not exist.
Second,
If God exists, then the universe is intelligible;
If God does not exist, then the universe is unintelligible.
()
Again Sartre had it right: If God does not exist, the human being is a useless passion.
()
Though no rigorous proof has been offered, the reader is left, perhaps uncomfortably, with some stark alternatives. Do I brush these questions aside arbitrarily, or do I face them head-on? Can I find some way between an existent God and an intelligible universe, and a non-existent God and an absurd universe, or not? If not, do I opt for the absurd universe?
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In these pages the technique of performative contradiction has often been employed, and it may again find an application here. The drive to know is a drive for intelligibility. To affirm the existence of God is coherent with that drive, for God is the Intelligibility of the universe, the cause, reason, and explanation of all those intelligibles which do not explain themselves. To deny the existence of God is to be incoherent, for the desire for intelligibility would be positing a final unintelligibility in the universe. Still, one might well ask. If the universe is absurd, what is the point of being coherent?

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Weisheit, common sense, Wissenschaft, Geisteswissenschaft, Logik

Kurzinhalt: Ungenügen: common-sense, Wissenschaft, Logik; Wertfreiheit, Einzelnes - Allgemeines, Gödel, keine Wissenschaft kann letzte Form menschl. Denkens sein

Textausschnitt: () The all-sufficiency of common-sense knowledge deprives the human mind of its full development. The person of common sense understands to live, so that intelligence is always harnessed to practical ends. Only the Greek breakthrough freed the mind from its traces and bridle to explore its own inner thrust - which has been seen to be unlimited. The restriction to short - term practicality simply rules out all such development.
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One problem with these sciences, at least in their present forms, is that they claim to be 'value-free.' But human living, as chapter 26 showed, is inescapably involved with values. Therefore a value-free science cannot be the final form of human knowing.
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The morality derivable from the structure of knowing had to remain general. But actual moral choices are between particular courses of action, to be performed by a particular person, in a particular situation.
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Logic proceeds by syllogism. But each syllogism needs two premises to generate one conclusion. If those two premises are to be logically demonstrated, they will require four premises; and those four, eight prior premises; and those eight, sixteen; and so on. In short, scientific and logical knowing cannot ground itself.
()
... Gödel. He showed that in any closed logical system, a question may be asked that cannot be answered within that system. Any set of premises can be shown to generate problems which require, for their solution, an additional premise, and so a larger logical system. The same will be true of that larger system, and so on. The upshot is that no logical system can ground itself.

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Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Weisheit, Durchbruch, Griechen, Christen, Aufklärung, Logos, Schwäche, Stärke, Ergänzung

Kurzinhalt: Ungenügen, Stärke, Ergänzung: Griechen, Christen, Aufklärung; Logos, Plato, Sokrates, Weiheit: nur persönlicher Erwerb

Textausschnitt: () One drawback of Greek thought was that it overly stressed the necessary.
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Another lack in the Greek breakthrough is an inadequate idea of God.
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On the one hand, it was the Logos who came personally in Christianity. As John's Gospel begins ... On the other hand, logos was central to Greek thought, as the very underlying order and rationality of the world. () Socrates () He could well have escaped the executioner, but he challenged his friends to show him that it would be the reasonable thing to do, and they failed. Thus Socrates lived and died the intellectual morality of never affirming without sufficient evidence, and the larger morality of doing nothing unreasonable.
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This marriage of Jerusalem and Athens may be seen, in retrospect, as a mating of strength with strength. The Jewish and early Christian weakness in systematic thought is corrected by absorbing the fruits of the Greek breakthrough. On the other hand, the abstractness of Greek thought is anchored by the concreteness of the incarnation, the overemphasis on necessity is tempered by the 'scandal of particularity,' and reason shelters under the canopy of faith. The overly intellectual nature of Aristotle's God is met by the Jewish and Christian God, a strong-willed God of love.
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The drawback of Christianity is its tendency to fission.
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What is positive about that Enlightenment, then, is ...
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Unfortunately, the third Enlightenment did not mesh as smoothly with the second as the second did with the first. In fact, the modern Enlightenment began by appealing to the first against the second. It appealed to Greek and Roman civilization as an arsenal and a standpoint from which to attack Christianity. That is what is most negative about the modern Enlightenment: its hostility to the Christian enlightenment.
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A second problem with the Enlightenment is that it overstresses the logical.
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A wisdom can only be proposed. It cannot, by its nature, be demonstrated, for wisdom escapes and goes beyond the logical.

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